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A . STATEMENT OF FIRM POLICY 
A N D SUMMARY OF CONTENT 
In all audit engagements, a specific review shall be made which is designed to 
determine the management's direct or indirect involvement in material transactions 
which are included in the financial statements. 
This Technical Letter (TL) establishes a working definition of "management's 
direct or indirect involvement in material transactions," for purposes of our review, 
and gives numerous specific procedures which can be employed to obtain, 
corroborate and evaluate evidence relating to such transactions. 
For purposes of this Firm Policy, we distinguish between two types of fraud: 
(1) a "defalcation" perpetrated because the victim company did not provide 
for the establishment of an adequate system of internal control, and 
(2) deliberate actions by management, including misrepresentations, whether 
or not collusive. 
This T L does not deal directly with defalcations which should be guarded 
against by an adequate system of internal controls. Instead, it aims at material 
transactions where there is a significant possibility of deliberate actions and 
misrepresentations by management, which in some instances constitute fraud. 
Our basic concern is to be as thorough as possible in locating concealed 
management involvement (management fraud) which has a material effect on the 
financial statements on which we are to report. However, most management 
involvement, as defined herein, is not "fraudulent," and accordingly we will be 
applying this T L mostly in such situations. 
No procedures within the abilities of auditors will necessarily guarantee the 
discovery of all concealed management involvement, but auditors should not resign 
themselves to nondiscovery because of the lack of such a complete guarantee. 
Philosophically, the entire audit process has to be brought to bear on the 
question of management involvement in material transactions. For that reason, 
some of the discussion and procedures indicated herein will be familiar to our 
personnel in their audit experience, though perhaps the focus is somewhat 
different. 
This document is not a "cookbook" which can be mechanistically followed. It 
is intended to stimulate thinking on the topic of management involvement in 
material transactions, both in the audit planning phase and during the audit 
performance. We do plan to issue additional materials facilitating the adoption of 
this TL , but it is necessary that we adopt this T L as our Firm policy at this date, in 
order to assure its implementation in all audits for calendar 1974 and thereafter. 
Generally, the procedures required by this T L are "substantive tests" as opposed to 
"compliance tests," and therefore it should be feasible to implement this T L even 
in those cases where considerable preliminary work on a calendar 1974 audit may 
have been done. 
The following points represent a highlight summary of the content and 
requirements of this TL . It is not a complete list of required actions, and is 
presented principally to aid you in remembering the entire content of this T L . 
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Definitions 
1. "Management" means any person(s) having responsibility for achieving the 
objectives of the organization, and the concomitant authority to create the 
policies and make the decisions by which the objectives are to be pursued. 
A person does not have to have any title in order to be management. Also, 
intercorporate relationships, such as parent/subsidiary, investor/investee, 
constitute management authority as hereunder defined. 
2. Management "involvement" exists whenever management represents any 
benefit-motivated interest in a transaction in addition to that of the 
company. This definition is not intended to result in "second guessing" 
management's good faith decisions intended to be beneficial to the 
company. Fundamental to financial reporting is the assumption that 
financial statements reflect the results of arm's-length bargaining between 
independent parties, unless otherwise indicated. Management can assure 
arm's-lengthness only by representing a single party at interest — that of 
the company - in a transaction. Direct involvement — for example a direct 
cash flow to the individual — is a matter of record (whether or not the 
record is available for audit inspection). Indirect involvement is not a 
matter of record but must be deduced; for example, the effect on an 
individual's ownership interest resulting from unjustifiably causing a 
favorable presentation to be made in the financial statements. 
3. A "transaction," for purposes of this T L is any event or condition which 
should result in an entry affecting the financial statements. The auditor 
must always be alert that some transactions may not be recorded; while 
this could be caused by inadvertent error, it could also include concealed 
transactions such as undisclosed guarantees, and deliberate misassessment 
of existing conditions which should be reflected in the financial 
statements. 
This T L applies to all material non-operating transactions, to operating 
transactions which are individually material and to individually small 
operating transactions in which the parties are actually or substantively the 
same, where the aggregate is material. This T L also applies to material 
external transactions entered into balance sheet accounts. 
4. All basic financial statements may be affected by management involve-
ment. Therefore, the purview of this T L includes the balance sheet, 
income statement, statement of changes in financial position, and 
stockholders' equity statements (or equivalents thereof in non corporate 
entities), and footnotes to the financial statements. 
5. Certain measures are identified as materiality levels for purposes of this 
TL, recognizing that the engagement management team will have to take 
into account qualitative factors in reaching a final conclusion as to the 
materiality or immateriality of management involvement. Thus, as a 
starting point, we believe five percent is the appropriate cut-off point. 
Quantifiable management involvement below five percent is presumed to 
be immaterial in the absence of qualitative factors to the contrary, whereas 
quantifiable management involvement of five percent or greater is 
presumed to be material, in the absence of qualitative factors to the 
contrary. 
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Separate audit segments, whether or not separately reported, shall be the 
basis of initial materiality decisions for purposes of this T L . 
Procedures 
1. As a backdrop for the performance of the required specific review, there 
are a number of "environmental" factors to be assessed: 
a. It is necessary that the auditor consider economic factors most likely 
to motivate management to become involved in material transactions. 
b. Experience has shown that the structure and style of operating a 
business may be deliberately designed to be conducive to management 
involvement. Perhaps the most critical points are those relating to 
adequate staffing of the financial function and relative permanence of 
financial officers. 
c. While the basic objectives of accounting control do not actually 
change with the method of data processing used, organization and 
control procedures utilized in EDP applications may differ signifi-
cantly from those utilized in manual or mechanical applications. 
There are risks inherent in business activities involving such massive 
volumes of individual transactions that total reliance is placed on 
computer operations. 
2. Fundamental to satisfactory compliance with this T L is that the audit 
management team: 
a. Analyze the company's business in planning the engagement. 
b. Plan the engagement so that upon its completion there will be a 
specific work paper record of all material transactions. 
c. Apprise all personnel on the audit of the foregoing analysis and plan. 
Procedures for obtaining information, required in all audits are: 
a. Review information normally available in our own files, such as 
permanent files, audit programs, the preceding years' working papers 
and recently prepared new client investigation material. Discuss with 
tax and management services personnel assigned to the client their 
knowledge of management involvement in material transactions. 
b. In the category of "information normally available from external 
sources," review board minutes, information gathered for SEC 
registrations, and the entire text of forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K (or 
equivalents) along with a perusal of exhibits filed therewith. 
c. Observe whether material transactions occur very close to year-end (or 
quarter-end). Consider whether documentary material may have been 
back-dated. 
d. We should review the results of recent "conflicts of interests" 
circularization by clients. 
Other procedures which are to be performed where the stated conditions 
exist, or otherwise in the discretion of the engagement management, are: 
a. Consider inspection of entries in public records concerning recording 
of real property transactions and personal property liens. Consider 
obtaining retail credit reports or using such other private investigative 
means as is responsive. 
b. In established and usually larger companies, key financial figures and 
ratios over a period of time should be reviewed for trends. 
c. Where the client's business is comprised of at least a material portion 
of small transactions, a review must be made to ascertain whether the 
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aggregation of transactions with substantively the same party results 
in a total which is material in the financial statements. 
d. Where the auditor assesses that conditions exist which afford the 
opportunity for management involvement in material transactions, he 
should obtain specific representations from the management person-
nel so situated. 
e. Conversations with company counsel may be useful in identifying 
management involvement. 
f. Where auditors other than Touche Ross are engaged as principal or 
secondary auditors, information should be exchanged with them 
concerning material transactions and possible management involve-
ment therein. Where we are a company's new auditors, our discussions 
with the previous auditors should include inquiries as to their 
knowledge of management involvement in material transactions. 
3. In order to corroborate information, two procedures are mandatory in all 
audits: 
a. Where there are instances of management involvement in material 
transactions, each such transaction should be specifically approved by 
the board of directors. 
b. Material transactions and balances should be confirmed by the other 
party to the transaction. 
Certain other procedures are applicable depending upon the circum-
stances: 
a. Inquiry of related party to ascertain possible inconsistencies between 
our client's understanding of, or representation as to, the transaction 
and the understanding of the transaction by the related party. 
b. Knowledge of a related party transaction does not impose on the 
auditor an obligation to audit the financial statements of the related 
party or to examine its records. However, in order to understand a 
transaction with a related party or its effects on the financial 
statements of the reporting entity, the auditor may decide it is 
necessary to inspect evidence in possession of the related party. 
c. Where a party independent of a material transaction is significantly 
involved in it as a facilitator (e.g., a bank or an attorney under certain 
conditions), consideration should be given to inquiring of such 
intermediate as to his understanding of the terms of the transaction. 
4. In evaluating information, there are certain procedures applicable in all 
audits: 
a. The auditor must understand the business purpose of each material 
transaction and be satisfied the manner in which the transaction is 
consummated is not unduly complex in arriving at such business 
purpose. 
b. The auditor must decide whether material transactions are presented 
in conformity with their substance. 
c. In situations where parties deal with each other in material trans-
actions, the auditor must reach a conclusion as to whether or not the 
parties are economically interdependent. 
d. Whenever management is indebted to the company in a material 
amount, the auditor is required to obtain evidence of the financial 
ability of management to settle the obligation. If collateral for such an 
obligation exists, the auditor should be satisfied as to its acceptability 
and value. 
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e. The auditor must inquire of the client (and watch for other evidence 
of) whether a material transaction in which there is management 
involvement has been compared to a similar arm's-length transaction. 
If such a comparison has been made (or is otherwise evident) the 
auditor should examine appropriate underlying evidence to evaluate 
whether or not the transaction results in an effect of the financial 
statements substantially equivalent to what would have occurred had 
the transaction been an arm's-length transaction. 
Documentation 
The audit programs, current working papers and permanent file must show 
specific evidence of our review. Where management involvement in material 
transactions exists, the partner in charge of the engagement is required to 
evaluate the financial statement disclosure and/or effect, and document this in 
his engagement memorandum or in a separate memorandum included as a part 
of the current audit files. 
Accounting and Reporting 
1. Transactions should be presented in financial statements in accordance 
with their substance. 
2. Where there is management involvement in a material transaction, 
disclosure thereof must appear in the financial statements or in the 
footnotes thereto. The disclosure should give, to the extent applicable,an 
identification of the parties to the transaction, the nature of the 
management involvement, the nature and amount of the transaction and 
the effect on income if determinable, the effect of the transaction on the 
balance sheet, the terms of the transaction and how they were established, 
and related information during the post-balance sheet period. 
3. No variation in the auditor's standard report is prescribed by this T L ; in 
situations of significant management involvement, we encourage the use of 
an explanatory middle paragraph. 
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INTRODUCTION 
B. BACKGROUND 
Under ASR 153 1 issued by the SEC on February 25, 1974, Touche Ross 
undertook to design procedures to accomplish, in all audit engagements, a specific 
review to determine management's direct or indirect involvement in material 
transactions which are included in financial statements. This T L was accordingly 
prepared, and represents a step toward the constructive resolution of a long 
standing problem for the accounting profession, namely, the independent 
accountant's responsibility for the detection of management's actions which may 
have implications of fraud. 
TL 149 should be viewed as an initial step in a continuing process. It should 
stimulate the practical development of enhanced applications of generally accepted 
auditing standards, to more clearly accomplish a contemporary objective — to 
surface those isolated situations in which failure to detect management involvement 
seriously detracts from the confidence which users of financial reports are entitled 
to have in the work of independent accountants. There is no implication of a 
general lack of confidence in the management of our clients. 
In order to further the foregoing objective, the content of this T L is directed 
towards: 
— creating an alertness to the types of environmental circumstances most 
conducive to motivating improper management involvement 
— excerpting existing related literature 
— defining the parameters of the audit effort 
— supplying guides for selective application in illustrated situations 
— emphasizing the integration of the review with other audit effort 
— indicating the requirements for work paper documentation 
— recognizing the need to accomplish the reporting of the results of our 
work in keeping with existing professional pronouncements on financial 
statement presentation. 
In summary, this T L recognizes that each engagement is unique and, 
accordingly, its primary purpose is to stimulate the thinking process in planning our 
audit approach, and in following through to an adequate conclusion as the work 
progresses. 
HOW TO USE THIS T L 
Admittedly, most of the conceptual content of this T L is not new; rather it 
represents an effort to orient such content to a contemporary objective, all in a 
single document. Therefore, all Firm personnel having responsibilities for audit 
work and unaudited engagements are required to read this TL. Other professional 
personnel are encouraged to read it. Because this T L is designed to be broad enough 
to stimulate thinking across our entire client spectrum, yet specific enough to aid in 
practical applications, an initial reading to capture its spirit should be undertaken. 
Afterwards, in the engagement planning process, it should serve as a reference 
1In Accounting Series Release 153, Touche Ross & Co., in connection with its 
certification of financial statements of U.S. Financial, Inc., which subsequently proved 
to be materially false and misleading, consented to an order entered under rule 2(e) of 
the SEC's rules of procedure, to accept certain sanctions, including the promulgation of 
this Technical Letter. 
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document. And, with a thorough understanding of the spirit of T L 149, the auditor 
can remain alert to management involvement possibilities during the performance 
of the audit. 
We plan to proceed, from this initial T L , with development of core 
document—type procedural listings, suitable for selective insertion in integrated 
programs, and as a supplement to existing core program documents. Eventually, the 
standard core documents will be revised, incorporating such procedures. We also plan 
to issue supplements covering: 
— Sample situations illustrating application of the definitions contained 
herein 
— Contemporary disclosure of and accounting for management involvement 
transactions, as found in current published reports and SEC filings 
— Application of this T L to specialized industries 
After some experience in the application of this T L , we will reassess its 
content. These planned future activities, however, in no way delay the current 
application of the policy requirement hereof in all calendar 1974 and subsequent 
audit engagements. 
RECENT CASES 
Details of recent cases are available in our Topical Index system (ACC-0750, 
PRO-0750, PRO-0800, PRO-1000). Certain aspects of these cases are highlighted 
here to give insight as to the kinds of undisclosed management involvement which 
had a material effect on financial statements. 
— U.S. Financial, Inc. — the chief officer of the company did not disclose his 
personal guarantees of down payment funds used by purportedly 
independent parties to purchase real property from the company; his 
guarantees were collateralized by company stock which he owned. The 
SEC's suit against this officer and the company also alleges 
"manufacturing" of transactions in an endeavor to stimulate or maintain 
the price of the company's stock, on which his personal fortunes may have 
been dependent. 
— Continental Vending — although the adjudication of the case was based on 
a conclusion that compliance with professional disclosure standards was 
not conclusive of good faith, the management involvement issue related to 
an advance of significant funds by Continental to Valley Commercial 
Corp. (an affiliated company of which Continental's president, Roth, was 
an officer, director and major stockholder). Valley, in turn, loaned 
amounts approximately the same as the Continental advance to Roth, who 
was unable to pay; securities subsequently pledged as collateral by Roth 
and others consisted largely of stock and debentures of Continental. The 
Appellate Court said in its decision that an accountant is under a duty to 
disclose what he knows when, to a material extent, a corporation is being 
operated for the private benefit of one of its officers, and not in the 
interest of all of the stockholders, regardless of how far removed by 
intermediary transactions from the company under examination. The 
court made a comparison to the responsibility to reveal known dishonesty 
of a high corporate officer. 
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- Bar Chris — management involvement centered around the continued 
reporting, at a nonaudited interim date, of favorable results which were 
subsequently found not to have been obtained. Such favorable results were 
contained in a registration statement for the purpose of selling additional 
securities to the public. 
- National Student Marketing - among the many issues in this complex 
case, at least two fall into the management involvement area: 
• premature recording of revenues which subsequently proved not to 
have been realized: reporting of favorable results at the earliest 
possible time ostensibly stimulated the market valuation of the 
company's stock, making it attractive to use for acquisition purposes. 
• the chairman of NSM also used his own stock in the company as an 
inducement for employment or as additional compensation, without 
disclosing such activities. 
— Equity Funding — the activities in this case were of three types: creation 
and inflation of assets, failure to record liabilities for borrowed cash and 
the creation of bogus insurance which was coinsured with other insurance 
companies. The effect of these practices was to inflate earnings and assets, 
and to create the appearance of sustained growth at a substantial but 
measured rate. The insurance fraud also provided some funds for critical 
cash needs.2 
Equity Funding has been referred to as the "great computer fraud," and 
although EDP processing was substantial, a rational analysis leads to the 
conclusion that persons, not computers, perpetrate fraud. 
— Realty Equities/Republic National Life Insurance — the SEC's complaint 
alleges, among other things, that Republic fraudulently reported material 
amounts of income, generated by Republic's advancing substantial sums to 
Realty Equities (in which Republic had a substantial investment) which 
were immediately returned as interest on debt owed by Realty, its 
affiliates and nominees. Involved in the case were allegedly inflated real 
estate appraisals. The two companies were audited by different auditors. 
The foregoing sampling of cases suggests that, whether premeditated or done 
under the exigencies of the moment, significant opportunities exist for concealed 
management involvement. 
G E N E R A L L Y ACCEPTED AUDITING STANDARDS 
Concerning the auditor's responsibility for fraud detection, the comments in 
SAS No. 1, Sections 110.05 through .08, are somewhat circular. Generally accepted 
auditing standards do not specify the extent of the auditor's responsibility for 
locating concealed management involvement in a material transation (management 
fraud). The following quotations from SAS No. 1 illustrate some imponderables: 
"The responsibility of the independent auditor for failure to detect 
fraud... arises only when such failure clearly arises from failure to comply 
with generally accepted auditing standards." (¶110.05) 
2Report of Trustee of Equity Funding Corporation of America, pages 32 to 34. 
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As to management involvement, there are two relevant comments in SAS No. 
1: 
" . . .although the discovery of deliberate misrepresentation by management is 
usually more closely associated with the objective of the ordinary examination, 
such examination cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery." (¶ 110.15) 
"If an objective of an independent auditor's examination were the discovery of 
all fraud.. he could not give assurance that all types of fraud had been 
detected, or that none existed, because.. .collusive fraud would not necessarily 
be uncovered." ( ¶ 110.06) 
It is yet to be demonstrated in practice that an audit examination performed 
even with the utmost diligence can assure the discovery of management fraud. 
However, in view of the need for continued public confidence in the usefulness of 
audits by CPAs, this T L provides an application of generally accepted auditing 
standards which gives recognition to the complexities of current business practices, 
and the greater opportunities for concealed management involvement presented 
thereby. 
SEC VIEWS 3 
ASR 153 is an expression of SEC views designed to exhort the public 
accounting profession to greater accomplishments in the area of discovering 
management fraud. During 1973 and continuing to date, the public remarks of SEC 
Commissioners and the SEC's Chief Accountant have often included comment 
about the seriousness of their concerns, and the need for action by the public 
accounting profession. 
Thus, ASR 153 may itself be viewed as a consequence of contemporary 
dissatisfaction with the failure of auditors to discover concealed management 
involvement. No useful purpose would be served by speculating whether "more 
diligent" application of auditing procedures could in fact have discovered some of 
the occurrences in recent cases. Touche Ross is committed to a constructive effort 
to further these objectives. 
3The New York Stock Exchange in its recent white paper also commented on its disin-
clination to accept companies for listing where such companies, as a matter of course, 
engage in non-arm's-length dealings. See Topical Index Docket No. 73-103, file NEW -
7200. 
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C. APPLICABILITY A N D IMPLEMENTATION 
G E N E R A L 
This TL applies to all audit engagements, whether or not the company is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. No conceptual basis exists for a dual 
standard as between "large and small" companies, or between "privately held and 
publicly held" companies. Generally, the smaller the entity, the less difficult it will 
be for the auditor to assess the opportunities for management involvement in 
material transactions. Conversely, privately held companies are often controlled by 
a few individuals, increasing the opportunities for management involvement. 
This T L does not apply to unaudited financial statement engagements. 
However, if in such an engagement we become aware of management involvement 
in material transactions, the responsible partner will have to make a judgment as to 
the appropriate disclosure, as well as the accounting effect, i f any, to be given 
thereto, as provided by SAS No. 1, ¶516.06-.07. The disclosure or accounting 
effect should be similar to what would be contained in financial statements audited 
in conformity with this T L . 
In connection with unaudited "stub" statements included in registration 
statements filed with the SEC, our review is to evaluate whether there are any 
events or circumstances which would have an effect upon the audited financial 
statements and our report thereon. Certain provisions of this T L expressly apply to 
the post balance sheet period, and therefore to such "stubs." Further, when 
performing a review for purposes of Section 11 of the Securities Act, the auditor 
must remain alert for indications of management involvement in material 
transactions. Although an auditor is not expected to apply significant auditing 
procedures to unaudited financial statements, where he obtains knowledge of 
management involvement in material transactions in such statements, he must 
pursue the matter to become satisfied as to the appropriateness of disclosure or 
accounting effect given. 
DISCUSSIONS WITH CLIENTS 
Our Firm has been instrumental in promoting the concept of audit committees, 
and we continue in our encouragement. We believe that, wherever practicable, this 
T L should be discussed in broad terms with audit committees, whom we would 
expect to understand the advisability of an audit scope which includes a review for 
management involvement. Where audit committees do not exist, the board of 
directors or appropriate representatives of management should be similarly 
informed. Of course, management, in any event, will become aware of our audit 
approach when the management involvement audit procedures deemed applicable 
to the engagement are performed. 
While the timing and extent of the discussion with clients concerning our 
Firm's adoption of this T L is to be performed at the discretion of the engagement 
partner, our Firm takes the position that the requirements of this T L represent an 
enhanced application of generally accepted auditing standards which we believe is 
being substantively adopted by the auditing profession. 
As discussions are held with directors or other members of management, you 
should consider telling them that it may be necessary to require more evidence in 
certain types of situations than we or the profession may have found acceptable in 
the past. 
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EFFECTIVE D A T E 
This T L applies in full to audits for calendar 1974 and thereafter. Because of 
the need for effective advance planning of engagements, compliance is not required 
with respect to audits for periods ending on or before November 30, 1974, if 
substantial work has been completed at the time of issuance of this T L . However, 
all audit work done after November 30, 1974, even though applicable to earlier 
audit periods, must be performed with a consciousness based on a thorough reading 
of this T L , so that evident situations will not be overlooked. 
The existence of an effective date does not limit our responsibility to follow up 
on our prior knowledge. 
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D - 1 . MANAGEMENT 
DEFINITION 
"Management" means any person(s) having responsibility for achieving the 
objectives of the organization, and the concomitant authority to create the policies 
and make the decisions by which the objectives are to be pursued. An essential 
feature of the authority of management as defined for purposes of this T L is that 
such authority is not subject to internal accounting control, although it may be 
subject to internal administrative control. 4 
DISCUSSION 
G E N E R A L 
An inherent limitation of any system of internal accounting control is that 
"...procedures designed to assure the execution and recording of transactions in 
accordance with management's authorizations may be ineffective against. . .irreg-
ularities perpetrated by management with respect to transactions or to the 
estimates and judgments required in the preparation of financial statements."5 
"The ultimate authority for business transactions rests with stockholders or 
other classes of owners except as circumscribed by law and is delegated by them to 
directors, trustees, officers and other management personnel."6 The foregoing 
quotation from SAS No. 1 is necessarily abstract, as the specific identification of 
management will vary from organization to organization. In some instances 
management authority will be vested in persons who do not carry any title 
whatever. 
Thus, the identification of management in a specific situation requires a 
thorough analysis of the nature of the business, in order to identify the sources of 
policy. In making this analysis, it should be observed whether certain positions of 
responsibility are reasonably subject to internal accounting controls. In those 
situations where the position does not seem susceptible of such controls, the 
auditor should ascertain whether existing internal administrative controls offer a 
reasonable restriction against deviations from the company's basic policies (such as 
those set by the Board of Directors). Where such administrative controls exist in a 
form which permits the auditor to test compliance therewith (this would 
necessitate the existence of verifiable documents), the administrative control should 
be considered an accounting control and reviewed accordingly. In those instances 
where such administrative control is exercised in a nondocumented manner, the 
positions of responsibility so controlled are deemed management positions which 
are also subject to the provisions of this T L . 
In addition to other procedures called for under this TL , the auditor should try 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the nondocumented administrative control in any 
situation where there is a significant opportunity for the management individual to 
be involved in a material transaction included in the financial statements.7 
4The foundation of this conclusion, though not explicit, is drawn from SAS No. 1, 
¶320.21, 22.27, 28 and 31. 
5SAS No. 1, ¶320.34. 
6SAS No. 1, ¶320.21. 
7Absence of practicable internal accounting controls over positions of responsibility 
subjected to nondocumented administrative controls, or to no controls, should be 
brought to the attention of a higher level of management, usually through our letter of 
recommendations. 
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POSITIONS OFTEN INCLUDED 
Because it is not possible to specifically identify positions which constitute 
"management" in every audit engagement, the auditor should prepare an analysis of 
the client's business to establish the sources of policy. He will consider the extent 
to which persons in the following positions, for example, are sources of policy: 
— Officers 
— Directors 
— Associates 
— Affiliates 
— Trustees 
— Partners 
— Co-venturers 
— Principal stockholders 
Some of the foregoing terms have SEC definitions.8 However, because definitions 
for purposes of federal securities laws may involve considerations other than those 
intended in this T L , they are not inclusive for purposes of our definition of 
management. Generally, the definition of "management" for purposes of this TL 
will be broader than that encompassed in the SEC definitions. 
The designation "principal stockholder" is subject to various understandings in 
addition to those contained in Rule 1-02 of Regulation S-X. 8 For purposes of this 
TL, "principal stockholder" is defined as "any person or entity, or a related group 
of persons or entities, who are the record or beneficial owners of 10 percent or 
more of the outstanding voting equity securities." (Where there are non-voting 
convertible securities, it is generally proper to make the determination on an " i f 
converted" basis; individual situations may be discussed with your Technical Center 
if there is a significant computational question.) 
Of course, this definition automatically includes corporate investors using the 
equity method of accounting; they are considered "management" of the investee 
because of the ability to exercise a significant influence. 
Two or more shareholders may be known or presumed to operate in concert 
through a voting trust, or informally; it is often difficult to identify such situations 
in the absence of a representation so asserting. Where these circumstances exist, the 
group may, in the aggregate, be a principal shareholder under our definition. Where 
a group is able to control the policies of a company, it is considered a control 
group. 
N A T U R A L PERSONS 
Ordinarily we think of management as individuals (natural persons), but it is 
also common to regard entities as "management." For example, it is convenient to 
regard a parent corporation as having management prerogatives. As a practical 
matter, however, management responsibility and authority is exercised through 
natural persons, and the authority of a parent company must ultimately be 
exercised by one or more individuals at that level. 
Natural relatives of management personnel also come within the purview of 
this TL. We do not propose to investigate, as a matter of practice, the economic 
8See Appendix A for SEC definitions. 
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endeavors of natural relatives of management personnel, but in fact there can be 
situations where circumstances, or information coming to our attention, will 
require that we include their relatives in our review. Likewise, we must concern 
ourselves with "relatives" of the company which are not natural persons. Keep in 
mind that any kind of organization, formal or informal, can exercise management 
influence. 
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D-2. INVOLVEMENT 
DEFINITION 
Management "involvement" exists whenever management represents any 
benefit-motivated interest in a transaction in addition to that of the company. 
DISCUSSION 
G E N E R A L 
Literally, management is involved in all transactions included in the financial 
statements — by authorizing, or delegating to appropriate personnel the authoriza-
tion of, all transactions. " . . .Authorization of transactions refers to management's 
decision to exchange, transfer, or use assets for specified purposes under specified 
conditions."9 There is always involved, at least theoretically, something more than 
the interest of the company — a personal and usually subconscious relationship 
between benefiting the company and justifying compensation therefor. Such a 
broad view of "involvement" is not intended in this TL , and can only result in 
"second guessing" management's good faith decisions intended to be beneficial to 
the company. 
ARM'S-LENGTH STANDARD 
"Fundamental to financial reporting is the assumption that financial 
statements reflect the results of arm's-length bargaining between independent 
parties." 1 0 When one of the parties to a transaction is able so to influence the 
management or operating policies of the other party, or if another party is able so 
to influence the management or operating policies of both, as to prevent one or 
each from fully pursuing or defending its own separate interests in dealing with the 
other, the parties are deemed, for purposes of this T L , not to be dealing at 
arm's-length. 
The foregoing is admittedly an abstract definition of lack of arm's-lengthness. 
However, in virtually every case, the ingredient causing lack of arm's-lengthness is 
the manner in which management (as broadly defined in D-1) is situated. Because 
management has the basic policy responsibility and authority, management can 
assure arm's-lengthness only by representing a single party at interest — that of the 
company — in a transaction. Where more than one "interest" is represented, such as 
economic self-motivation (beyond justifiable remuneration) of the management 
individual or group having the responsibility and authority for the particular 
transaction, arm's-lengthness is irrefutably presumed to be absent. 
SCOPE OF DEFINITION 
The preceding paragraph exemplified the additional management interest in a 
transaction simply as "economic self-motivation." Of course, the interests, in 
addition to those of the company, which management can represent in a given 
9SAS No. 1, ¶320.21. 
1 0 ASR 153, Page 8. There are numerous other references to arm's-lengthness in the 
professional literature and in significant writings by CPAs. For example, consider the 
combination of Paragraphs 199 and 90 of APB Statement No. 4, "Basic Concepts and 
Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises." 
8/1/74 19 T.L. No. 149 
transaction are more complex. Economic gain to an individual may take on many 
forms in addition to direct financial enhancement. For example, it may include 
undue influence over the accounting practices and related disclosures of the 
company, so as to present a favorable reporting designed to enhance the value of 
the management individuals' ownership interests — either presently owned or 
obtainable through existing stock options, or designed to bolster bonus, deferred 
compensation or profit sharing plan amounts. 
"Involvement" can take on many forms. An illustrative but not all-inclusive list 
follows: 
— Buyer 
— Seller 
— Guarantor 
— Lessee 
— Lessor 
— Forbearer (See D-4) 
— Debtor 
— Creditor 
— Nominee 
— Franchisee 
— Franchisor 
— Licensee 
— Licensor 
DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT 
Direct involvement is a matter of record (whether or not the record is available 
for audit inspection). Direct involvement will, therefore, be accomplished by the 
particular management individual or group having the dual interest. Direct 
involvement is signified by the nature of the results — for example, a direct cash 
flow to the individual. Indirect involvement is not a matter of record but must be 
deduced. For example, indirect involvement is represented by the effect on an 
individual's ownership interest resulting from unjustifiably causing a favorable 
presentation to be made in the financial statements. 
Difficult decisions are required in the situation where one member of 
management remains silent concerning his knowledge of another member's 
involvement. In order to have "involvement" as defined herein, it must result from 
the exercise of management authority. These determinations are often complex, 
inasmuch as the "silent" member may nonetheless be receiving an indirect benefit 
because he too may be a stockholder or optionee. Furthermore, questions of 
seniority often come into play — a subordinate member of management may be 
aware of some type of involvement by a senior member of management, and it is 
natural to expect some reluctance on the subordinate's part in disclosing matters 
about which he may not be entirely sure. On the other hand, where a senior 
member of management is aware of involvement by a subordinate member of 
management, failure of the senior officer to take action could represent an 
improper discharge of his responsibilities (failure to exercise proper internal 
administrative control) and could give rise to questions as to whether indeed there 
was some direct or indirect benefit to the senior member of management. 
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We recognize that management involvement may exist in transactions covering 
the compensation and expense reimbursements of management. Ordinarily 
sufficient internal controls can be established to assure arm's-lengthness (for 
example, approval of significant salaries by the Board of Directors, and review of 
expense reimbursements by management at a level senior to that being considered) 
to eliminate such transactions from the "management involvement" category. 
Again, difficult questions arise when the management personnel basically sets its 
own compensation or other monetary rewards (for example, by domination of the 
Board of Directors). 1 1 
Involvement by natural relatives of management, or by entities commonly held 
to have management interest, such as parents, may be direct or indirect, in the same 
manner as involvement by management may be. 
In some instances, there may be a "close relationship" between management of 
the company and the other party to the transaction, with such relationship not 
clearly fitting within the definition of "management" given earlier; for example, 
there may be a limited number of buyers and sellers who regularly deal with each 
other, giving rise to concern about the verifiability of the terms of the 
transactions.12 Furthermore, companies may deal with each other under 
reciprocity arrangements of such proportions as to indicate an economic 
interdependence. (See E-4, "Economic Interdependence.") 
SITUATIONS E X C L U D E D 
In some rare cases, management involvement can exist even though there is no 
direct or indirect benefit to the management person involved. This might occur, for 
example, where management has a desire to establish some sort of record, or to 
apply some method of accounting or presentation — considering these achievements 
a challenge. Such activities, if unjustified, are to be uncovered as a part of other 
audit procedures not dealt with in this T L . We intend to cover herein only such 
management involvement which has as its intent a direct or indirect economic 
benefit to the management so involved. 
Furthermore, we do not consider management involvement to exist solely by 
reason of economic dependence1 3 arising from normal business relationships (for 
example, major supplier, customer, lender or borrower) that do not give one party a 
management influence over the other party. However, we recognize that such 
conditions will have to be thoroughly reviewed to insure that management 
involvement does not exist. 
11See Item 17 of Form S-1, "Remuneration of Directors and Officers."This suggests that, 
because in the setting of compensation there can be lack of complete objectivity, the 
SEC believes certain disclosures to investors are appropriate. 
12See APB Statement No. 4, ¶90. 
13The concept of "economic dependence" differs from that of "economic inter-
dependence," a mutuality concept. See E-4. 
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D-3. TRANSACTIONS 
DEFINITION 
A "transaction," for purposes of this T L , is any event or condition which 
should result in an entry affecting the financial statements; ordinarily a transaction 
affects current financial statements, but some transactions, such as stock options, 
are executory and usually do not result in a current entry. 1 4 
DISCUSSION 
G E N E R A L 
Apart from the definition adopted in this T L , transactions include exchanges 
of assets or services with parties outside the business entity, as well as transfers or 
use of assets or services within i t . 1 5 A transaction arising as the result of relations 
with an outsider is an external transaction; one resulting from the expiration of 
cost, or by an accrual, transfer or allocation of income or expense, is an internal 
transaction.1 6 The distinction between internal and external transactions is 
obviously dependent on one's perception of the "boundaries" of the business 
entity. 
Internal transactions often do not have an effect on the financial statements, as 
they merely represent movements between categories which are classified together 
for financial reporting purposes (for example, the reporting of inventories may not 
be affected by a transfer in classification as between inventory subaccounts). Other 
internal transactions, however, can affect the financial statements because they 
represent the recording of estimates as to assets and liabilities not yet actually 
created in external exchanges. 
Generally speaking, this T L deals with transactions which appear to be 
external. Most internal transactions are susceptible of other appropriate auditing 
procedures. As indicated in Section D-2 hereof, the fact that management can 
affect their personal economic condition by unjustifiably presenting a favorable 
picture requires, however, that our audit scrutiny of internal transactions which 
have an effect on the financial statements should consider the possibility of 
management involvement, as we perform our other auditing procedures in 
connection therewith. We emphasize that internal transactions are expected to be 
justified by sufficient evidence in the possession of the company; thus the question 
of possible management involvement in such transactions should arise where there 
is an apparent insufficiency of documentation. 
While external transactions may be either monetary or nonmonetary,1 7 there 
is no such thing as a monetary internal transaction. Thus, at first glance it may 
14Some options are compensatory, requiring current entries, under APB Opinion No. 25. 
15See SAS No. 1, ¶320.20. 
16 For example, see Kohler, Dictionary for Accountants 
17 APB Opinion No. 29, ¶1, indicates: 
"Most business transactions involve exchanges of cash or other monetary assets or 
liabilities for goods or services. The amount of monetary assets or liabilities exchanged 
generally provides an objective basis for measuring the cost of non-monetary assets or 
services received by an enterprise as well as for measuring gain or loss on nonmonetary 
assets transferred from an enterprise. Some transactions, however, involve either (a) an 
exchange with another entity.. .that involves principally nonmonetary assets or 
liabilities or (b) a transfer of nonmonetary assets for which no assets are received or 
relinquished in exchange." 
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appear that the payment of compensation to management personnel for services 
represented to have been rendered, and reimbursement to such personnel for 
expenses represented to have been spent on behalf of the company, are internal 
transactions; in fact they are external monetary transactions which by definition 
include a probability of management involvement at least at certain levels. 1 8 On 
the other hand, there is usually no misunderstanding of the fact that transactions 
between a company and its management, in the company's regular business line 
(e.g., the purchase of product by management), are external transactions. 
ATTRIBUTES OF TRANSACTIONS 
The primary functions involved in the flow of transactions include their 
authorization, execution and recording. Authorization may be general or specific, 
the former representing authorization for all transactions of the same type (for 
example, standard selling prices), while the latter deals with a single transaction. 
Execution of transactions includes the entire cycle of steps necessary to complete, 
the exchange or transfer, and frequently involves numerous stages. Recording of 
transactions comprehends all records maintained with respect to the transactions, 
including the preparation and summarization of records. 1 9 
The auditor must always be alert that some transactions may not be recorded. 
Sometimes failure to record is inadvertent — for example, poor cut-off procedures 
on inventory receipts — and the usual audit examination is directed toward such 
situations where they could have a material effect on the financial statements. In 
other cases the failure to record a transaction is deliberate and in accordance with 
established policy — for example, it is not unusual that a subsidiary company 
receives services from its parent at "no charge." 2 0 However, deliberate 
nonrecording would also include: 
— Concealed transactions such as undisclosed guarantees which would have 
the effect of negating a transaction as recorded to that point (an external 
transaction). 
— Misassessment of existing conditions which should give rise to recording 
— for example, not recognizing an allowance for an uncollectible account 
in a particular instance when it is known to be uncollectible (an internal 
transaction). 
Another term often applied to some transactions is "unsupported." We 
mention it here only to dispel the idea that existence of support is an intrinsic 
attribute of a transaction. In fact, "unsupported" means "unauditable" because 
sufficient evidence is not available to the auditor. The question of appropriate 
evidence is discussed in Section E of this TL . 
CLASSES OF TRANSACTIONS 
The first broad categorization of income statement transactions for purposes of 
18See, for example, Item 17 of Form S-1. 
19SAS No. 1, ¶320.20, 22, 23 and 24. 
2 0 Contemporary financial statement handling of this situation is discussed in Section F. 
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this Technical Letter is between "ordinary" and "nonordinary." Ordinary 
transactions are generally meant to include the regular business of a company — the 
"ordinary course of business." Nonordinary transactions are any transactions which 
are not " in the ordinary course of business." 
The basic distinction between ordinary and nonordinary is facilitated by 
reference to APB Opinion No. 30, in the following manner: any transaction which 
is extraordinary, unusual or infrequently occurring is considered "nonordinary" for 
purposes of this TL . Income statement transactions not classifiable into one of 
these three categories are considered ordinary operating transactions. Within 
operating transactions, a company's ordinary course of business may include many 
small transactions, or a small number of large transactions, or some combination of 
the two. 
Considering the foregoing distinctions, this T L applies to all material 
nonoperating transactions, to operating transactions which are individually 
material, and to individually small operating transactions in which the parties are 
actually or substantively the same, where the aggregate is material. 
The above comments are stated in terms of income statement recognition. 
There are, of course, material transactions which do not immediately or directly 
impact the income statement. For example, a purchase of machinery may be a 
material transaction, but the effect on income is ordinarily small in any given 
period because of the allocation of depreciation over a relatively long period of 
time. Therefore, our review must also ascertain whether there are material external 
transactions entered into balance sheet accounts, not audited from the income 
statement perspective, which require the application of procedures indicated later 
in this TL . 
ABSENCE OF TRANSACTIONS; FORBEARANCES 
In relatively infrequent circumstances, the auditor may need to question 
whether management responsibility and authority is exercised to prevent the 
occurrence of transactions, or to cause forbearance. While neither of these 
situations falls squarely within our definition of "transactions," they may represent 
circumstances affecting the financial statements. 
Management involvement resulting in absence of transactions or forbearances is 
perhaps more conveniently explained by illustration. For example, a member of 
management may personally acquire a parcel of property which is of interest to his 
company; or he may have management interests in more than one company 
performing the same basic function, giving him the choice of including basically 
indistinguishable transactions in one company as opposed to another (motivated, 
for example, by perceived tax consequences). An example of forbearance with 
management involvement would be the failure of a lending institution to foreclose 
on defaulted debts under circumstances where there is some commonality of 
management between the debtor and the lender. Another example might be the 
failure to enforce a guarantee given by a company whose management also exercises 
management authority in, or may personally be, the party who is beneficiary of the 
guarantee. 
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D-4. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AFFECTED 
DEFINITION 
Al l basic financial statements may be affected by management involvement as 
earlier defined. Therefore, the purview of this T L includes the balance sheet, 
income statement, statement of changes in financial position, and stockholders' 
equity statements (or equivalents thereof in non-corporate entities), and footnotes 
to the financial statements. 
DISCUSSION 
B A L A N C E SHEET 
Hardly any external transactions of an enterprise do not affect its balance 
sheet. The balance sheet includes assets and liabilities representing realized benefits 
and sacrifices (generally, monetary assets and liabilities) as well as assets for which 
potential benefits have not yet been realized and liabilities for which sacrifices have 
not yet been made (generally, nonmonetary assets and liabilities). 2 1 
It is possible to have management involvement in both realized and unrealized 
assets and liabilities. For example, management involvement in realized assets and 
liabilities would exist where a loan is made to the company by a lender having 
management influence over the company, or where there is common management 
influence of both the lender and the company by another party. Or a sale 
transaction in which there was management involvement may cause an uncollected 
receivable in the balance sheet, which, of course, carries with it the same 
management involvement attributes as the sale transaction. 
In the unrealized asset area, purchases of inventory may be made from vendors 
who. have management influence over the company, or who share the same 
management influence as the company. Such purchases are carried in the balance 
sheet as assets until they become an element of cost of sales or expense. Or the 
purchase of a plant from a party which has management influence over the 
company will usually impact on the balance sheet for the duration of its 
depreciable life. 
Thus, even though a "management involvement transaction" may have 
occurred some time in the past, it could still have a material effect on the balance 
sheet because of the remaining resultant assets or liabilities. A typical example is 
the elimination in consolidation of intercompany profits in depreciable assets. We 
do not intend, by this T L , to require a review of the origin of all amounts in the 
balance sheet (see C-3, "Effective Date"). However, to the extent it is or becomes 
known to us that there exists previously undisclosed management involvement in 
material transactions affecting the balance sheet, and to the extent that we have not 
substantively evaluated the effect of such management involvement (see Section 
E-4 hereof), it will be necessary for the auditor to review these situations to be 
satisfied that financial statement disclosures or accounting effect given thereto, if 
any, are appropriate. 
There also may be material transactions, in the balance sheet accounts which 
"wash out" within an audit period, leaving no ending balance visible to the auditor. 
A material loan or advance to a member of management, repaid before year-end, is 
an example. The possibility of such occurrences requires consideration in the audit 
plan for account analysis. 
21See Report of the Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements, page 35. 
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INCOME STATEMENT 
While the current income statement is of major concern in our review for 
management involvement in material transactions, any income statement covered 
by our accountants' report has considerable importance, whenever it is 
presented.2 2 The concerns about management involvement resulting, perhaps, in 
unjustifiable recognition of income or an unjustifiably favorable presentation are 
important with respect to prior periods because of trends. The fact that 
management involvement existed in prior periods' transactions but not in the 
current period may be important information for the user of financial statements, 
just as readily as the opposite set of circumstances. 
Again, we do not intend to exhume prior income statements on which we have 
already rendered our auditors' reports; however, where we possess or currently 
obtain knowledge of such prior involvement and we have not substantively 
evaluated the need for disclosure or accounting effect, we will currently have to do 
so under Section E-4 hereof. 
STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY STATEMENTS 
Some transactions represented by receipt or disbursement of monetary assets, 
or disbursement of nonmonetary assets, are appropriately entered directly in 
stockholders' equity accounts. Dividends in cash or in kind are typical examples, 
and APB Opinion No. 29 expounds at some length on such nonreciprocal transfers 
with owners. Such transactions must also be reviewed for management involvement 
under this TL . Prior period stockholders' equity transactions are to be reviewed 
only to the extent called for by our knowledge of management involvement (as 
indicated in the preceding paragraph). 
STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN FINANCIAL POSITION 
Because the statement of changes in financial position articulates with the 
other basic financial statements, it is unlikely that original information concerning 
management involvement can be obtained by direct reference to this statement. 
However, disclosures concerning management involvement may be appropriate on 
the face of, or referenced to, this statement. 
FOOTNOTES 
The term "footnotes" should be understood to mean any disclosures outside 
the basic financial statements indicated above, where the disclosures constitute an 
integral part of the financial statements. Thus, for example, a separate "statement 
of accounting policies" which precedes the footnotes or the basic financial 
statements would be included. 
Because footnotes are used to explain elements of the basic financial 
statements, our primary concern would likely be the adequacy of disclosure of, 
rather than accounting effect given to, management involvement in material 
transactions. However, there are those situations where separate financial 
statements, often condensed, are presented as part of the footnotes, such as for 
unconsolidated subsidiaries and Opinion 18 investees, and such financial 
statements (assumed by virtue of their presentation to be deemed material to the 
overall financial statements in which they are included) will have to be subjected to 
review for management involvement in material transactions, to the extent the 
ultimate effect on the basic financial statements being examined may be material. 
22See D-3, "Classes of Transactions," for classification of income statement transactions to 
which this TL is applicable. 
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For example, an unconsolidated wholly-owned finance subsidiary carried on 
the equity method in the basic financial statements must be viewed as having 
transactions of materiality 2 3 equal to those of the parent company, even though 
only a single equity amount appears in the parent company financial statements. 
On the other hand, in a 25 percent-owned company for which condensed financial 
statements are presented in a footnote and which has management involvement in 
material transactions which are not related to the investor, the materiality of such 
information is proportionately reduced as to the investor's financial statements on 
which we are reporting. 
23Materiality is covered in Section D-5. 
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D-5. MEASURES OF MATERIALITY 
L A C K OF ADEQUATE DEFINITION 
Materiality is an abstract concept applied in the preparation of financial 
statements which depends upon the preparer's (and auditor's) perception of the 
views of the financial statement users. Recognizing that there is an interaction 
between the knowledgeability of the user and the nature of the information 
presented, some attempts have been made to characterize the knowledgeability 
factor by categories such as "informed investor," "average investor," "professional 
analysts," "sophisticated investors," and so forth. So far, such attempts have not 
focused on defining what level of knowledge places a financial statement user in 
some of one of these categories. 
Numerous specifications have been given to materiality. The SEC uses a 
multitude of materiality percentages (see ¶4004 of our Firm's SEC Practice 
Manual, Volume I) and has recently proliferated such specifications in Accounting 
Series Releases with respect to the measurement of materiality of trends. 
Accountants in public practice become inculcated with subjective views of 
materiality based upon their own experiences and often on firm-imposed guidelines. 
If anything can be said about specific levels of materiality in recent years, most 
accountants in public practice would accept as a fact that tolerance levels have 
become lower. 
As we await the attention of the Financial Accounting Standards Board to the 
topic of "materiality" now on its agenda, the most current definition (admittedly 
abstract) of materiality may be found in the Objectives Study Group report (page 
57): "Information should be disclosed in financial statements when it is likely to 
influence the economic decisions of the users of financial statements. Information 
that meets this requirement is material. Considerations of materiality are necessarily 
judgments. These judgments should relate to the significance of the information 
and its impact on users' economic decisions. Since each component of financial 
statements provides information, judgments of materiality should be applied to 
each component, as well as to aggregates and, therefore, should not be used to 
justify offsets." 
DISCUSSION 
G E N E R A L 
Regardless of the measure of materiality adopted, it seems clear the measure 
has to be lowered when there is management involvement in a transaction. For 
example, if it would be appropriate to regard as material in a given company an 
event or condition measureable as greater than 10 percent of net income to be 
reported, management involvement in the event or condition would ordinarily 
cause the auditor to decide that something of a lesser order is material. The reason 
for this tendency — and it should not be repressed — is because of the auditor's 
awareness that contemporary society often has a tendency to view management 
involvement of almost any degree as challengeable. For example, many laymen may 
consider an absolute amount, such as $100,000, as material regardless of the size of 
the entity. On the other hand, the auditor cannot take the position that the 
materiality level for transactions having management involvement is zero, regardless 
of what allegations could be publicized against the management so involved as a 
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result thereof, without making the financial statements unintelligible in many 
instances. 
Another problem confronting the auditor is that management involvement may 
not be susceptible of quantification except in the broadest of generalities. For 
example, a parent-subsidiary relationship could be characterized as "pervasive," but 
in view of the parent's usual ability to arrange transactions among components for 
the benefit of the entire consolidated entity, the management involvement inherent 
in the parent-subsidiary relationship is often not susceptible of further quantifica-
tion. Thus, numerical guidelines do not accomplish the desired objective under 
these circumstances. 
It should also be noted that it is usually not possible to quantify, in any 
materiality scale, the effect of absence of transactions or forbearances (see Section 
D-4) and it is often extremely difficult to quantify unrecorded transactions (see 
Section D-3, Attributes of Transactions). 
SEGMENT-BASED MEASURES 
Separate audit segments, whether or not separately reported, shall be the basis 
of initial materiality decisions, for purposes of this TL. 
Sometimes materiality is misassessed because of the decentralization of an 
audit engagement or the separation of a client's business into numerous 
components, such as separate functional or line of business subsidiaries. In the 
performance of our audit procedures, materiality must first be measured at the 
level — such as a subsidiary company audit referred to another office — on which 
the audit engagement is focusing. To the extent that only a single set of 
consolidated financial statements are eventually presented, aggregations of mate-
riality should be made deliberately and documented as a separate step. Offsets of 
"plus and minus" management involvement transactions, whether with the same or 
different members of management, are not permissible under this TL. It is 
dangerous, for example, to consider an event or condition existing at a 
nonreporting subsidiary level as being immaterial based upon the subsidiary 
auditor's estimation of overall financial statement magnitudes. Such items may be 
later overlooked in the required aggregations to evaluate overall materiality. Where 
different auditors or different offices are involved, there is also a chance of 
misunderstanding. 
Where separate component reports are also issued, materiality must, of course, 
be measured at that level. This requirement does not directly affect those audit 
engagements which are appropriately performed from the perspective of the 
consolidated figures, since aggregations are automatically accomplished. However, 
the materiality measurements will have to be disaggregated in those situations 
where we issue reports on separate component financial statements. 
WORKING DEFINITION 
Subject to all the foregoing imponderables about appropriate levels of 
materiality, the Firm believes that certain measures should be identified as 
materiality levels for purposes of this TL, recognizing that the engagement 
management team will have to take into account qualitative factors in reaching a 
final conclusion as to the materiality or immateriality of management involvement. 
Thus, as a starting point, we believe 5 percent is the appropriate cutoff point. 
Quantifiable management involvement below 5 percent is presumed to be 
immaterial in the absence of qualitative factors to the contrary, whereas 
quantifiable management involvement of 5 percent or greater is presumed to be 
material, in the absence of qualitative factors to the contrary. 
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The 5 percent should be measured in relation to the appropriate bases. Some 
transactions are, of course, measurable against more than one base. The specific 
identification of the base will be dependent upon the composition of the 
company's financial statements, but the following are given as guides: 
— Balance sheet — assets or liability balances, as well as external transactions 
which "wash out" during the audit per iod 2 4 are measured in terms of 
total assets; 
— Stockholders' equity — transactions having an effect on stockholders' 
equity should be measured at 5 percent of the total thereof; 
— Income statement — if the transaction is an operating transaction (as 
defined in Section D-3) it should be measured at 5 percent of income 
before extraordinary, unusual or infrequently occurring items. If it is a 
nonoperating transaction (as defined in Section D-3), the base for 
measurement should be pre-tax income. 
In this computation, it would be usual to state all amounts before 
consideration of income tax effects. In those situations where a manage-
ment involvement transaction is not taxable or deductible because of the 
involvement factor, the bases should be "tax effected" in making the 
materiality computation. 
Admittedly, where there is an operating or net loss, complications arise in the 
application of the foregoing simple guidelines. Likewise, the appearance of trends in 
financial statements must be kept in mind. 
PRECEDENCE OF E X T E R N A L REGULATION 
Some laws and regulations specify materiality levels. Wherever these levels 
apply to management involvement, they should be observed, instead of the basic 5 
percent figure given above. For companies subject to the SEC, there are a number 
of such requirements. However, in following SEC definitions of this nature, the 
auditor is not given specific instruction as to inclusion in the financial statements; 
most often, the SEC requirements call for disclosure elsewhere in the filed 
documents. 
Indentures and other agreements may contain de facto measures of materiality 
regarding management involvement. Ordinarily, such non-regulatory limitations 
would be governing only if they were stated at less than 5 percent. 
24 See Section D 4, "Balance Sheet." 
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E-1. PROCEDURES - G E N E R A L 
OVERVIEW 
A major purpose of this TL is to create a state of awareness on the part of 
auditors at all levels. While a portion of the implementation of this T L will occur by 
being alert, as other normal audit procedures are performed, for possibilities of 
management involvement, prior experience has shown that something more 
procedural is needed. If, however, this T L is viewed as a wholly separate audit 
phase, it will be very time consuming, often repetitive of other audit procedures, 
and probably impracticable of application because of the "inquisition" complexion 
it would then take on. 
Nonetheless, the auditor will have to analyze the business both to identify the 
material transactions and to understand the opportunities which may exist for 
management involvement in material transactions. If he concludes there are such 
possibilities with respect to material transactions, he will need to employ auditing 
procedures which might not have been considered previously; he will need to 
employ responsive procedures to gather evidence and evaluate the material 
transactions. Thus, there is additional effort required. 
In a first engagement, we must thoroughly consider possibilities for manage-
ment involvement, identify existing situations to the extent possible, corroborate 
and evaluate them, and make a record for review in future years. However, the 
thoroughness expected in a first engagement is not a unique requirement of this T L ; 
it simply responds to the fact that lack of previous experience with the client 
requires extra effort in all audit areas. 
It should also be noted that not all information concerning management 
involvement in material transactions is deliberately concealed. Often, it is not 
"advertised," but it may be available to the auditor for the asking. It can also be 
expected that many management persons, usually in smaller companies, will not 
grasp the contemporary significance of management involvement, and will not, 
therefore, provide relevant information without being asked. The crucial discovery 
will , of course, be the deliberately concealed management involvement, but 
alertness to recognize "nonadvertised" management involvement is also to be 
emphasized in the application of this TL. 
NATURE OF AUDIT EVIDENCE 
"The measure of validity of . . . evidence for audit purposes lies in the 
judgment of the auditor; in this respect audit evidence differs from legal evidence, 
which is circumscribed by rigid rules. Evidential matter varies substantially in its 
influence on the auditor as he develops his opinion with respect to financial 
statements under examination. The pertinence of the evidence, its objectivity, its 
timeliness, and the existence of other evidential matter corroborating the 
conclusions to which it leads all bear on its competence." 2 5 
The following excerpts from SAS No. 1 highlight evidential matter for auditing 
purposes: 
— "Evidential matter supporting the financial statements consists of the 
underlying accounting data and all corroborating information available to 
the auditor." 
25SAS No. 1, ¶330.02 
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— "To be competent, evidence must be both valid and relevant. The validity 
of evidential matter is so dependent on the circumstances under which it is 
obtained that generalizations about the reliability of various types of 
evidence are subject to important exceptions." Recognizing this depend-
ency on circumstances, however, a few generalizations are given: 
• Evidence obtained from independent sources provides a greater 
assurance than internal evidence 
• Satisfactory conditions of internal control offer greater assurance of 
reliability of the resulting accounting data and financial statements 
• "Direct personal knowledge of the independent auditor obtained 
through examination, observation, computation, and inspection is 
more persuasive than information obtained indirectly." 
— "In making [decisions as to the sufficiency of evidential matter, the 
auditor] should consider the nature of the item under consideration; the 
materiality of possible errors and irregularities; the degree of risk involved, 
which is dependent on the adequacy of the internal control and 
susceptibility of the given item to conversion, manipulation, or misstate-
ment; and the kinds and competence of the evidential matter available." 
— "In the great majority of cases, the auditor finds it necessary to rely on 
evidence that is persuasive rather than convincing." 
— "The . . . difficulty and expense involved in testing the particular item is 
not in itself a valid basis for omitting the test." 
— "The independent auditor should be thorough in his search for evidential 
matter and objective in its evaluation." 
The foregoing citations have been selected as being most in point to this TL. 
We recommend, however, that all the Firm's auditors reread Sections 330, 331 and 
332 of SAS No. 1 in their entirety. 
While we continue our encouragement of the practice of extensive conversa-
tions with the client to obtain information as to business results, possible 
forthcoming audit problems, etc., conversation in and of itself does not constitute 
acceptable audit evidence. The phrase "conversational auditing" in reality is a phase 
of auditing — i.e., obtaining information which has to be corroborated before it is 
considered valid. 
Negative assurances rarely constitute adequate evidence, if they operate to 
withhold information needed by the auditor. For example, a representation that 
unidentified parties to a material transaction are not related to the company is 
unacceptable. It is true that obtaining information from a party thought to be 
independent but in fact in collusion with management is no better than a negative 
assurance, but adoption of such a view for audit purposes is illogical because it is 
postulated on a fraudulent act. 
A significant question arises as to the meaning of "determine" in the context 
of our Firm policy stated in Section A . " [S]pecific review shall be made which is 
designed to determine management's direct or indirect involvement in material 
transactions." The primary definition of "determine" contained in Webster's New 
Collegiate Dictionary is "to fix conclusively or authoritatively." In the art of 
auditing, however, Kohler 2 6 defines "determine" in this manner: "to reach an 
26Kohler, Dictionary for Accountants 
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opinion [emphasis added] consequent to the observation of the fit of sample data 
within the limit, range or area associated with substantial conformance, accuracy or 
other predetermined standards." Short of having proof as to all aspects of the 
financial statements, there is no way to determine, in the Webster sense, the 
existence of management involvement; however, it is certainly our obligation to 
form an opinion as to (that is, perform a review designed to determine) the 
existence of management involvement and the effects thereof. 
CONDUCIVE ECONOMIC FACTORS 
It is necessary that the auditor consider economic factors most likely to 
motivate management to become involved in material transactions. In this section 
we are dealing with the indirect benefit intended to result from manipulation of the 
company's financial statements, because management involvement may be designed 
to protect or enhance the management individual's personal wealth. Without 
attempting to be exhaustive, listed below are conducive economic factors: 2 7 
— Lack of sufficient working capital and/or credit to continue the business 
— The urgent desire for a continued favorable earnings record in the hope of 
supporting the price of the company's stock 
— Massive demands for new capital in a developing industry and accordingly 
extreme competition therefor 
— Dependence on a single or relatively few products, customers or 
transactions for the ongoing success of the venture 
— Little available tolerance on debt restrictions, such as maintenance of 
working capital and limits on additional permissible debt, or in complying 
with terms of revocable licenses necessary for the continuation of the 
business 
— The industry is declining or is characterized by a large number of business 
failures 
— Excess capacity has befallen the company — for example, from the energy 
crisis 
— Existence of significant litigation, especially litigation between stock-
holders and management 
— Extremely rapid expansion of business or product lines 
— Numerous acquisitions, particularly as a diversification move 
— In accounts receivable, difficulties in collection from a class of customers, 
for example, energy-related businesses, real estate investment trusts 
— Significant inventories, the physical qualities of which require evaluation 
not within the expertise of the auditor 
— A long-term manufacturing cycle for the company's products 
— Unrealistic sales projections to justify continued capitalization of start-up 
costs in program-oriented accounting for new products or ventures 
27See also "Analysis of Trends" in Section E-2. 
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— Significant obsolescence dangers because the company is in a high 
technology industry. 
In the course of performing your audit, you should be alert to the above kinds 
of situations which may cause management involvement, so as to attempt to 
forestall undesired consequences. 
BUSINESS STRUCTURE 
Experience has shown that the structure and style of operating a business may 
be deliberately designed to be conducive to management involvement. Of course, in 
the vast majority of cases, the business structure and style adopted are meant to be 
responsive to the abilities of the management as well as the business geography and 
product diversification. Accordingly, we must be cautious in our evaluation of the 
rationale for a business structure and operating style. Although widely dispersed 
businesses probably show a greater incidence of subsequently discovered manage-
ment involvement, there are some notable cases of such involvement where virtually 
all records were centralized. 
We indicate below a number of structure and style features which may afford 
opportunity for management involvement, and which require consideration in our 
overall audit scope: 
— The business locations of the company are widely dispersed, key 
documents are created at outlying locations, and evidence as to a material 
transaction must be obtained in more than one location 
— The company is highly diversified, having numerous different businesses, 
each with its own accounting system 
— The management is dominated by one or a few individuals 
— The company follows the practice of using different auditors for major 
segments 
— The company seems to need, but lacks, an adequate internal audit staff 
— Key financial positions, controllers for example, do not seem to stay filled 
very long 
— The company has no outside general counsel, using special counsel for 
individual matters; or outside general counsel seem to be switched with 
some frequency 
— The accounting and financial functions appear to be understaffed, 
resulting in constant crisis conditions 
— The audit closing requires numerous substantive adjusting entries 
Perhaps the most critical points in the above examples are those relating to 
adequate staffing of the financial function and a relative permanence of financial 
officers. Chaotic closing environments offer ideal conditions for manipulation, and 
frequent rotation of financial officers not only prevents the building of strength in 
the function, but could be indicative of such personnel leaving, or being asked to 
leave, when they "object" to company practices. 
RELIANCE ON COMPUTERS 
The objectives of accounting control may be influenced by the method of data 
processing used, causing the procedures employed by the auditor in his review, tests 
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of compliance, and evaluation of accounting control to be influenced significantly 
if there is extensive computer processing of data affecting the financial statements. 
While the basic objectives of accounting control do not actually change with the 
method of data processing used, organization and control procedures utilized in 
EDP applications may differ significantly from those utilized in manual or 
mechanical applications. In some advanced EDP systems, control functions which 
would otherwise be performed by several individuals and departments may be 
concentrated within the EDP function. 
Frequently, functions are performed through the use of an EDP program or 
series of programs that would be considered incompatible if performed by a single 
individual. A person having the opportunity to make unauthorized changes to any 
such programs has a significant opportunity to manipulate, regardless of whether he 
is a member of management (as defined herein), or whether he holds a position not 
adequately subjected to practicable internal controls. 
In some EDP systems, certain programs are used to perform generalized 
functions for many application programs. These programs include "operating 
systems," which supervise EDP equipment that may be processing one or more 
application programs at a given time, and "data management systems," which 
perform standardized data handling functions for one or more application 
programs. Individuals having access to these kinds of programs may, in effect, have 
access to application programs and data files. 
There are risks inherent in business activities involving such massive volumes of 
individual transactions that total reliance is placed on computer operations. To the 
extent that there are insufficient internal controls, such circumstances open 
opportunities to manipulation by management and others to mask fraudulent 
transactions, to create earnings, or divert assets. 
Our Firm's policy in this regard is stated in T L No. 1 3 8 2 8 : 
• " . . . an EDP control review is required when: 
• we are performing an examination leading to expression of opinion on 
financial statements, and 
• the client uses computers to produce financial data, and 
• the use of the computer has had significant impact on the system of 
internal control over the financial data so produced." 
TL No. 138 will, of course, be applied to audit engagements in accordance with 
its provisions. For purposes of this TL dealing with management involvement, the 
personnel involved in the EDP control reviews are admonished to remain alert to 
opportunities open to the "policy level" of management to improperly utilize the 
computer operations and processing for accomplishment of "management involve-
ment" objectives. 
INTERRELATIONSHIP OF OBTAINING, CORROBORATING AND 
E V A L U A T I N G INFORMATION 
In the sections which follow, guidelines are given for obtaining, corroborating 
and evaluating information. While the guides are separated into these three 
categories, as a practical matter procedures are performed in some combination; 
much of the effort is in fact part of the basic audit, with the combination or 
28TL 138 will be incorporated into the Accounting and Auditing Practice Manual in 
September, 1974. 
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approach varying as called for by the unique circumstances of the engagement. 
Therefore, while a given procedure may be indicated as applicable to one of the 
three phases, it may be equally applicable to the other phases. 
While our Firm requires that a specific review be made with respect to possible 
management involvement in material transactions we reemphasize that it should not 
represent an entirely separate segment of the audit. However, in recognition of the 
specificity requirement, documentation described in Section E-5 will need to be 
prepared for the audit working papers to indicate the appropriate review was made. 
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E-2. PROCEDURES - OBTAINING INFORMATION 
G E N E R A L 
Keep in mind that we are looking for deliberately concealed management 
involvement, as well as information concerning management involvement which 
may be available if we are astute enough to make the proper inquiries, and to watch 
for it throughout our other audit procedures. We are also dealing with relationships 
known from our prior experience with the client. 
It bears emphasizing that this TL does not deal with basic requirements for 
profit recognition, balance sheet inclusion or capital charge or credit. Whatever 
generally accepted accounting principles are applicable to the item in question must 
be met, and such audit procedures as are applicable to a transaction, apart from the 
question of management involvement, must be fulfilled. The procedures discussed 
herein are intended to deal with the question of management involvement, and not 
with other applicable auditing procedures. 
Fundamental to satisfactory compliance with this TL is that the audit management 
team: 
— Analyze the company's business in planning the engagement: A good audit 
demands a knowledge of the objectives of the enterprise, an assessment of 
who sets those objectives and the policies for their accomplishment, an 
understanding of the extent of delegation of authority, the controls 
which exist to monitor the exercise of authority and knowledge of unique 
circumstances of the company's industry or industries. 
— Plan the engagement so that upon its completion there will be a specific 
workpaper record of all material transactions: This should be appro-
priately cross referenced to workpapers which evidence performance of 
audit procedures designed to determine whether there was management 
involvement. 
— Apprise all personnel on the audit of the foregoing analysis and plan: 
Summarize this information in writing (in the current audit program if 
possible) so as to provide an available reference to the auditor during the 
performance of the audit work. Specify names of directors, officers and 
other management as defined in this TL, and names of parents, subsidiaries 
and other affiliated entities. 
In order to review whether management involvement exists, or where it is 
known to exist, information about material transactions should be obtained and 
documented, ordinarily as follows: 
— Identification of the transaction 
— Identification of the parties to the transaction 
— The nature of already known management involvement (for example, 
parent-subsidiary, common ownership, direct dealing between the com-
pany and its management, etc.) 
— The nature and amount of the transaction and effect on income if 
determinable (if there are numerous transactions of the same type, obtain 
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the volume and effect of transactions for all periods to be reported 
upon, 2 9 including the current post balance sheet period) 3 0 
— The effect of the transaction on the balance sheet for all balance sheets to 
be reported upon, 2 9 including financial position as of the end of the post 
balance sheet review period (and if balances remain outstanding at that 
time, obtain an indication of how they are to be settled) 
— The terms of the transaction and how they were established. 
In short, be sure to obtain complete information about all material 
transactions. 
While it is the client's obligation to provide information we request for 
necessary audit purposes, it is unrealistic to expect that in all cases the foregoing 
information will be available in a concise form to be handed over to us. Thus, it 
may require extracting from and digesting of various documents, and in fact some 
of the information may not be determinable except as the auditor proceeds through 
corroboration of the transaction. 
Naturally, when the auditor obtains information concerning deliberately 
concealed management involvement in material transactions, prompt and decisive 
action is called for in a manner dictated by the judgment of the audit partner in 
charge. If a publicly-held client is involved, the matter must promptly be brought to 
the attention of the appropriate Technical Center Director. 
Indicated below are broadly worded procedures, some of which are identified 
as required in every audit, or wherever the stated circumstances exist. We obviously 
cannot specify all the circumstances under which a given procedure will be 
applicable or specify all possible procedures, as these will naturally depend on the 
nature of the business and other client attributes. 
INFORMATION N O R M A L L Y A V A I L A B L E IN TR FILES 
— Procedure in all audits 
Review information available in our Firm's prior audit files relating to the 
engagement, or in our new client acceptance material if recent, to 
observe: 
• known situations of management involvement which require con-
tinuing attention 
• circumstances which afford significant possibilities for management 
involvement, if such circumstances may not have been fully pursued 
in engagements prior to the effective date of this T L . 3 1 
Inquire of Tax and MS personnel assigned to the client as to their 
knowledge of management involvement in material transactions. 
29Refer to Section D-4 regarding limitations on our review with respect to financial 
statements for periods ending on or before November 30, 1974. 
30SAS No. 1, ¶430.02 requires adequate disclosure of, among other matters, ". . . the 
existence of affiliated or controlling interests and the nature and volume of 
transactions with such interests" 
31Refer to Section D-4 regarding limitations on our review with respect to financial 
statements for periods ending on or before November 30, 1974. 
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— Discussion 
In continuing engagements, our permanent files, audit programs, the preceding 
year's working papers, and (if we are auditing a recently accepted client) our 
documentation of new client investigation, may contain applicable information. To 
the extent they do, the matter should be extracted for the current year's audit 
working papers, to assure appropriate consideration. The existence of past 
management involvement in non-recurring material transactions may, in some 
instances, be indicative of current opportunities or propensities. Where a company 
by its nature (such as a component) has a considerable amount of management 
involvement in material transactions, it will be desirable to create a separate section 
of the permanent file, to facilitate annual updating and review. 
With respect to new clients, we will be amassing our information foundation, 
and thus, apart from the predecessor auditor's working papers, 3 2 there may not be 
a great deal of prior information to review. However, if the client is publicly held or 
meets certain other criteria requiring Executive Office approval for acceptance, 
there will be a substantial amount of information gathered as part of the new client 
investigation procedure (see Section 71 of the Accounting and Auditing Practice 
Manual). 
In a large majority of situations, our audit clients engage the services of our 
Tax function to prepare, or advise in connection with the preparation of, income 
tax returns. Also, client executives often engage our Tax Department to prepare 
their income tax returns. Accordingly, a direct inquiry must be made of the partner 
responsible for tax services to the client and its executives (or other tax personnel 
he designates as being knowledgeable with respect thereto) as to whether the Tax 
Department has found any evidence, not already known to the Audit function, 
concerning management involvement in material transactions.33 Recognizing that 
tax return preparation almost invariably postdates the audit completion, tax 
personnel should be asked to bring to the audit partner's attention relevant 
information arising after completion of the audit. 
If we provide management consulting services to the client, the partner 
responsible for such services (or others he designates as being knowledgeable with 
respect to those consulting engagements) should be asked whether, during the 
course of the consulting engagement, any information came to his attention 
concerning management involvement in material transactions which may not 
already be known to the Audit function. 
INFORMATION N O R M A L L Y A V A I L A B L E F R O M E X T E R N A L SOURCES 
— Procedure in all audits 
Review the information, where applicable, identified in the first three 
paragraphs below. 
— Discussion 
It is a recognized audit procedure that minutes of meetings of the board of 
directors and important committees thereof be reviewed. In performing this review, 
we should be alert to expressed or implied indications of management involvement 
in material transactions. 
32See "Other Auditors" later in this Section, and the Accounting and Auditing Practice 
Manual concerning relationships with predecessor auditors. 
33See IRS Regs. ¶7216 and refer to Tax Practice Manual, Section 34.0 
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If the company has recently had a first SEC registration (or a registration has 
recently occurred after several years during which no registrations were filed) the 
company's counsel (special SEC counsel, if engaged) will have performed a 
circularization of management for purposes of disclosures which had to be made in 
the registration statement (for example, see Item 20 of Form S-1). Where these 
circumstances exist, we should obtain, with the authorization of our client, access 
to the counsel's circularization files. 
Also, recurring registration statements, proxy statements, stock exchange 
listing applications, and the non-financial portions of Forms 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K (or 
equivalents) may contain information concerning management involvement. It is 
generally understood that we review the complete text of all such documents 
somewhere during the course of our audit engagement. There may be isolated 
instances, however, where we did not obtain or review the voluminous exhibits 
which accompany some of these filings. Accordingly, this T L reaffirms our Firm's 
practice of reviewing the text of all such documents, along with a perusal of 
exhibits filed therewith. 
A rather obvious source of external information is represented by trade 
newspaper and magazine articles about the client. Our Firm assumes that such 
newspapers and periodicals, if they exist with respect to the client's specific 
industry, are reviewed either by engagement personnel or in specific instances by a 
Firm functional organization which digests and communicates it. Occasionally, such 
publicity will describe operating practices or innovations which may point to 
possible management involvement. 
ADDITIONAL E X T E R N A L SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
— Procedure 
Where called for by the nature of the client's business or where we have 
unresolved doubts about the nonexistence of management involvement in 
material transactions, relevant external information which is available 
through specific arrangements should be obtained. 
— Discussion 
With respect to real property, there will be a governmental jurisdiction in 
which recording of titles and mortgage liens is performed. It may, perhaps, be very 
difficult to review such information because often it can only be inspected at the 
recorder's office. Further, the nature of information so recorded must comply only 
with minimum legal provisions and, therefore, may not show management 
involvement even if it exists. Nonetheless, where real estate transactions are 
material in the financial statements on which we are to report, it may be necessary 
to review the entries related thereto in the public fi les. 3 4 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, anyone who accepts personal property 
as collateral for a loan will have to record that transaction to protect his interest. 
This recording is posted in public files maintained by an agency of the respective 
state where the property is located. Most states provide a search service for these 
public files, which we may access to determine the existence or lack of recorded 
security interest against any of our client's personal property (the Uniform 
Commercial Code does not cover real estate). Refer to T L No. 135 and Topical 
Index File UNI-7000, for additional guidance where Uniform Commercial Code 
procedures are deemed appropriate. 
34See TRCP-80, Section 271., item 4 (included in TR Real Estate Industry Manual, 
Vol. 1). 
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Retail Credit Reports may be requested (see Section 71 of the Accounting and 
Auditing Practice Manual) in circumstances where we need external information 
but we do not wish to arouse the individual or entity (it is not necessary to notify 
the parties to be investigated, under Regulation Z , unless our inquiry is deemed to 
be for the purpose of granting credit — which purpose does not exist in this audit 
procedure). 
In a less independent manner, Dun & Bradstreet reports may give basic 
information, although they usually contain data provided directly by the subject. 
Where general information is desired, it might be better to make direct inquiries so 
as to avoid the possibility of miscommunication by having Dun & Bradstreet in the 
middle. 
In extreme circumstances, an extraordinary measure may be taken - the 
engagement of a private investigator. The value of such a procedure as audit 
evidence is doubtful. More likely we would conclude, prior to taking such a step, 
that a particular transaction with which we are concerned is unauditable, with the 
consequent effect on our auditors' report. 
ANALYSIS OF TRENDS 
— Procedure 
In established and usually larger companies, key financial figures and ratios 
over a period of time, say five years, should be reviewed for trends. 
Unusual deviations should be investigated. 
— Discussion 
Financial analysis is a good audit planning tool, apart from the clues it might 
give for purposes of this TL. Our Firm has developed "Financial Analysis as an 
Audit Tool," released on Topical Index Docket No. 74-27, File FIN-7000. That 
material identifies a time-sharing program helpful in performing financial analysis. 
TIMING OF M A T E R I A L TRANSACTIONS 
— Procedure in all audits 
Review the incidence of material transactions. Do they occur very close to 
the year-end (or quarter-end)? Are there signs that transactions were 
closed in haste, or that the documentary material may have been 
back dated? 
— Discussion 
In a business involving a large volume of small transactions, the auditor expects 
to see a relatively level, seasonally adjusted, transaction volume. In instances where 
a small number of large transactions comprises the business, it may be credible that 
the closing of transactions clusters near year-end or quarter-ends. However, such 
circumstances require more thorough audit certainty to establish the appropriate-
ness of the timing of transactions — certainly a problem not unique to the 
provisions of this TL . 
It may also be determined by the auditor that documentation was executed 
subsequent to the period end, intended by the parties to be effective as of the 
period end. In some cases, legal advice may be required as to whether the 
transaction is binding on (thus legally impacting on the assets and liabilities of) the 
company on the "as o f date. Enforceable agreements in principle or oral 
agreements are sometimes considered acceptable, pending "completion of the paper 
work." 
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The problem of timing of transactions is a difficult one even where the parties 
are fully independent of each other, and we do not propose to resolve this question 
in this TL . However, where there is management involvement in the transaction, the 
auditor is likely to be unable to establish the appropriateness of an "as o f date. 
CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF S M A L L TRANSACTIONS 
— Procedure 
Where the client's business is comprised of at least a material portion of 
small transactions, a review must be made to ascertain whether the 
aggregation of transactions with substantively the same party results in a 
total volume of transactions which is material in the financial statements; 
if so, the relationship with the other party must be reviewed to assess 
whether management involvement exists. 
— Discussion 
Often, reliable information as to total purchases from a single vendor, or total 
sales to a single customer, are readily available to us. In other instances, we may 
have to devise procedures to extract such information from the company's files, or 
to audit information provided which may not be integrated into the financial 
accounting records (e.g., sales statistics). 
Keep in mind that, under the definition of transactions for purposes of this TL, 
all financial statements are involved. Therefore, expenditures for capitalized assets, 
for example, come within the purview of this aggregation requirement. 
"CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS" PROGRAMS 
— Procedure in all audits 
If a client has a policy of performing a circularization of its management 
group for "conflicts of interests" we should review the results of the 
current year's circularization. (In the first audit to which this TL applies, 
review the most recent circularization, if within the last three years.) 
Many major corporations have such procedures, but it is relatively uncommon 
in small organizations. In those instances where it is used, our Firm is often engaged 
to receive the completed questionnaires, to decide which should be brought to the 
attention of the designated committee or individual in the client's organization. 
When we are involved in the client's circularization program, we may be aware of 
possible management involvements from our screening of the answers. 
A major drawback of such a program is that it does not, of course, have any 
means of assuring that the respondents answer truthfully. Further, such question-
naires will not cover all "management" as defined herein — e.g., principal 
stockholders. 
MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIONS 
- Procedure 
Where the auditor assesses that conditions exist which afford the 
opportunity for management involvement in material transactions, he 
should obtain specific representations from the management personnel so 
situated that (if such is the case) they have no direct or indirect 
involvement in the transaction; further, such a letter must re-aver the 
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representations made to us concerning the identity of the parties to the 
transaction, the purpose of the transaction (if not evident) and the terms 
thereof. 
— Discussion 
Management personnel could, of course, have personal reasons for diverting 
further inquiries, if they should be asked to provide specific representations 
concerning a material transaction. However, the mere fact that representations are 
not satisfactory evidence per se in such situations does not eliminate their 
usefulness as a starting point, and as documentation of what the auditor was told. 
There may be significant client relations problems created if the auditor 
indiscriminately adopts an "affidavit" of sorts, even on a fairly limited basis. 
Therefore, where the auditor considers it desirable to obtain specific representa-
tions by this procedure, he will have to exercise judgment as to the level of 
management to which he will direct his inquiry, and as to whether he will extend 
his representation procedure beyond the management individual involved. For 
example, if it is decided in a subsidiary company that a representation of this 
nature is to be obtained, it may be more appropriate to obtain it from management 
of the parent company rather than an officer of the subsidiary. Also, it would be 
rare that the auditor would ask for representation from individual family members 
of the management individual; where there is a concern of this nature, he would 
ordinarily have the management party express such representation for his family 
members. 
INQUIRY OF COUNSEL 
— Procedure 
Conversations with company counsel may be useful in identifying 
management involvement. Usually, counsel will require authorization from 
the appropriate member of management prior to engaging in such 
conversations. 
— Discussion 
If counsel has been recently involved in an SEC registration (see "Normally 
Available External Data" above), we should discuss with him his evaluation of the 
information obtained, as he will be conversant with some situations if they exist. 
Otherwise, counsel may indeed be limited in his knowledge of related party 
transactions, and cannot be considered an exhaustive source. (See also Section E-3, 
"Inquiry of Intermediates" regarding transactions in connection with which counsel 
has provided services.) 
There has been considerable contemporary discussion about the effects of 
attorneys' disclosures to auditors concerning litigation and contingencies. It is, 
therefore, conceivable an attorney could take a position that the existence of 
management involvement in material transactions represents a contingency on 
which he does not wish to report, perhaps because of the danger of destroying legal 
privilege. Where we are informed that the attorney is aware of management 
involvement in material transactions concerning which he will give us no further 
information, we will have to impose on our client to cause the attorney to describe 
the circumstances to us, or to confirm the information given us by the company. 
As a practical matter, an attorney having knowledge of management 
involvement in a material transaction will have formed some value judgment as to 
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the acceptability (and reportability if a publicly held company) of the transaction. 
Therefore, refusal to discuss this matter with us, while acknowledging that such 
transactions exist, could be indicative of the attorney's serious concern. 
We expect that management involvement in material transactions, when 
prohibited by law, external regulation or covenant, will be disclosed to us by 
counsel as part of his overall attorney's letter, to the extent he has knowledge of 
such violations and he deems them material. 
OTHER AUDITORS 
— Procedure 
Where auditors other than Touche Ross are engaged as principal auditors, 
we should discuss with management personnel of such auditors whether 
they are aware of management involvement in material transactions of the 
entity or component on which we are to report; and we will provide 
similar information concerning the segment we are auditing. 
Where we are the principal auditors, we should engage in such discussions 
with the other auditors in all cases where the component's assets, net 
assets or income are five percent or more of consolidated figures, or where 
there are material transactions between the components. 
Where we are a company's new auditors, our discussions with the previous 
auditors should include inquiries as to their knowledge of management 
involvement in material transactions. 
Where we are the succeeded auditors, we will, if requested by the new 
auditors, orally comment to the extent of our knowledge concerning this 
matter. 
— Discussion 
We should be satisfied that the client's explanation of the need to have more 
than one auditor is plausible. 
Where we are the principal auditor on an engagement, SAS No. 1, Section 543, 
and our Firm's Accounting and Auditing Practice Manual govern our relationships 
with secondary auditors. For purposes of this TL, whether or not we will make 
reference to the other auditor in our auditors' report, we should specifically discuss 
with the other auditors the question of possible management involvement in 
material transactions affecting the overall financial statements on which we are to 
report. Because the secondary auditor will be dealing with a component of the 
overall entity, it is common that there will be transactions between that portion of 
the entity we are auditing, and the portion audited by the secondary auditor. If 
only consolidated financial statements are involved, the effect of intercomponent 
dealings will be eliminated in consolidation. In other material circumstances, 
however, appropriate disclosures are required in the financial statements on which 
we are to report. 
Where Touche Ross is in the secondary auditor position, it is very important 
that discussions be held with the principal auditors concerning the possibility of 
management involvement. Our Firm's policies in this situation are covered in the 
Accounting and Auditing Practice Manual. 
In the area of relations between successor and succeeded auditors, the extent 
of information exchanged has recently come under question. In the past, all that 
may have been available from the succeeded auditors is an indication that they 
"know of no professional reason why we should not accept the engagement." To 
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comply with this TL , succeeded auditors should be questioned concerning 
knowledge they may have, not apparent from their working papers (which we 
intend to review 3 5) concerning management involvement in material transactions. 
Where we are the succeeded auditors, we will ordinarily make our working 
papers available.3 5 Working papers prepared after the effective date of this T L will 
contain information concerning management involvement where it has been found 
to exist, and that should be sufficient information to the succeeding auditors. If we 
are succeeded prior to performing an audit engagement to which the provisions of 
this T L apply, we will, upon inquiry, comment on matters of management 
involvement to the extent we are aware of them. 
Discussion between principal and secondary auditors and between successor 
and predecessor auditors will require the client's permission, which we presume 
will be granted. 
Subjective information of a negative nature should not be provided to other 
auditors without first clearing the substance thereof with our Firm's Executive 
Partner-Legal. 
35Criteria for review of other auditors' or our workpapers are given in the Accounting 
and Auditing Practice Manual. 
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E-3. PROCEDURES - CORROBORATING INFORMATION 
G E N E R A L 
The third standard of field work under generally accepted auditing standards 
is: "Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, 
observation, inquiries and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion 
regarding the financial statements under examination." 3 6 
"To be competent, evidence must be both valid and relevant." 3 7 "The amount 
and kinds of evidential matter required to support an informed opinion are matters 
for the auditor to determine in the exercise of his professional judgment after a 
careful study of the circumstances in the particular case." 3 8 
It is not feasible to identify all the techniques available to the auditor to 
corroborate information. However, within the broad areas of inspection, 
observation, inquiries, and confirmation, there are several procedures which may 
have particular applicability to management involvement in material transactions. 
APPROVAL BY DIRECTORS 
- Procedure in all audits 
Where there are instances of management involvement in material 
transactions, each such transaction should be specifically approved by the 
Board of Directors (or equivalent body in noncorporate businesses) and so 
recorded in the minutes. The auditor should observe that such approval 
substantively exists. 
— Discussion 
It is common practice that non-concealed management involvement in material 
transactions is a subject of resolution at the Board of Directors level. Of course, 
discovery of concealed management involvement is unlikely to gain Board approval, 
but rather some other action which will be taken by the Board or its 
representatives. 
Heretofore, it has also been a common audit procedure that an auditor having 
doubts about whether a company's business purpose has been furthered, or at least 
not hampered, by management involvement in a material transaction, has been able 
to request and obtain the Board of Directors' approval of such transaction. We may 
expect to encounter some reluctance from directors who are not accustomed to 
taking such positions; a discussion with the company's legal counsel as to the nature 
of our concern may be helpful so that legal counsel could then advise the Board as 
to the need for approval. 
In any event, where we believe such approval is required and it is not 
forthcoming, we will have to consider the material transaction as unauthorized, and 
therefore unacceptable for financial reporting purposes. Care must be taken not to 
demand Board of Directors' attention to insignificant items, for example, a 
question concerning the generosity of an executive's expense allowance which in 
and of itself is not a material figure in the financial statements. (Such matters, of 
course, may be brought to the attention of the appropriate levels of management, 
including the Board, but we should not require formal resolution except in cases 
which have a material impact on the financial statements.) 
36SAS No. 1 ¶330.01 
37SAS No. 1 ¶330.08 
38SAS No. 1 ¶330.09 
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As indicated earlier in this T L , the setting of compensation for management is 
a transaction in which there obviously is management involvement. We should be 
satisfied that the Board of Directors has approved all significant compensation 
arrangements, including stock options and bonus plan. 
In some organizations, the Board of Directors may be substantially or 
completely comprised of "inside" members — that is, all officers of the company. 
Thus, approval of a material transaction in which there was management 
involvement may not really be substantive. In the case of publicly held companies, 
there will at least be some number of outside directors. In major publicly held 
companies, there will be a substantial proportion of outside directors who will 
clearly bring a strong measure of independence to the Board. If the company is 
publicly held but does not appear to us to have sufficient independent membership, 
or sufficient independence of outside directors, both we and the company may 
require outside legal advice. Admittedly, this is an undesirable position to be in, but 
must be dealt with if the judgment of the partner in charge of the engagement 
indicates such a problem. 
If the transaction occurs in a segment of a larger entity, it will usually be more 
appropriate to require approval of the Board of Directors of the parent company. 
CONFIRMATION OF MATERIAL TRANSACTIONS 
- Procedure in all audits 
Material transactions and balances (whether or not suspected of having, or 
known to have, management involvement) should be confirmed by the 
other parties to the transaction. 
— Discussion 
While it has been customary to confirm material balances, confirming the terms 
of a material transaction has not been uniformly accepted in auditing practice. For 
purposes of this TL , the auditor should confirm the terms of, and balances resulting 
from all material transactions with the other parties thereto, whether or not 
balances exist at the audit date. The inquiry should specify the documents involved 
in the transaction, and inquire as to whether there are any other documents or 
understandings. (For other information to be included in the confirmation request, 
refer to Section E-2, "General.") Admittedly, such a procedure is unlikely to detect 
collusive practices between the parties to a transaction, but could disclose a "side 
deal" or perhaps a guarantee by a member of management, making the transaction 
acceptable to an independent party. 
In some cases, components for example, the auditor knows in advance that a 
balance confirmed by a component would rarely constitute independent evidence. 
Where the confirmation would be sent to a component of the entity and we are 
auditing both components, we may be able to obtain the needed information by 
direct reference to the component's records. Where we are the principal auditors 
but do not audit the component, we usually have the right to look into the 
component's records 3 9 and may want to do so; in such situations we will ordinarily 
still want to obtain the confirmation. 
It is important to keep in mind that there may be industry practices (such as a 
small group of buyers and sellers) which defeat successful confirmation efforts. 
39See SAS No. 1, Section 543 
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INQUIRY OF R E L A T E D P A R T Y 
— Procedure 
In specific situations, a related party may possess a degree of 
independence. If the auditor perceives this to be the case, he should 
discuss (and perhaps obtain confirmation in writing of) the details of the 
transaction, directly with management representatives and/or auditors of 
the related party. 
— Discussion 
Defining "degrees of independence" is not practical. But examples can be given 
of circumstances under which the auditor will consider making an inquiry of the 
related party: 
— Where a party is a related party by virtue of APB Opinion 18 (the ability 
to exercise a significant influence), and there are material transactions with 
that party, the companies may nonetheless be substantially autonomous. 
— In the case of a subsidiary which has a publicly held minority interest (a 
"visible" subsidiary) the composition of the Board of Directors of the 
subsidiary may deliberately contain independent members to provide 
"protection" for the minority interests. 
— In many cases, the related party will have other auditors, making 
practicable some corroboration of the related party's representations 
through discussions with and information obtained from the other 
auditors (see Section E-2, "Other Auditors"). 
Even where a degree of independence does not exist, and therefore inquiry of a 
related party takes on the character of a representation rather than a confirmation, 
it may be advisable, as indicated in "Confirmation of Material Transactions" above, 
to make such inquiry as it may turn up inconsistencies between our client's 
understanding of, or representation as to, the transaction and the understanding of 
the transaction by the related party. 
REVIEW OF R E L A T E D PARTY RECORDS 
— Procedure 
Knowledge of a related party transaction, or concern that a material 
transaction might involve a related party (i.e., a management involvement 
transaction), does not impose on the auditor an obligation to audit the 
financial statements of the related or other party or to examine its records. 
However, in order to understand a transaction with a related or other 
party or its effects on the financial statements of the reporting entity, the 
auditor may decide it is necessary to inspect evidence in possession of the 
related or other party. 
— Discussion 
When the auditor is faced with a material transaction for which he cannot 
otherwise obtain sufficient competent evidential matter, his only other opportunity 
to eliminate the implied restriction on his audit scope may be to request access to 
examine evidence in possession of the other party to a transaction. While the 
auditor risks irritating parties which are truly independent, an explanation to our 
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client of our need to obtain adequate evidence should permit the necessary 
arrangements to be made. 
Where there is no more than a possibility of management involvement in a 
material transaction, it is inconceivable that we would insist on performing an audit 
of the other party to the transaction. However, where the parties to a transaction 
are clearly related (such as, for example, through common ownership) we may 
justifiably take the position that we are unable to express our opinion on the 
financial statements of one of the companies without performing an audit of the 
related entity. 
Under some circumstances, the other party to a material transaction could be 
requested to provide information bearing some sort of attest by its independent 
auditors other than Touche Ross. (Refer to Section E-2, "Other Auditors.") 
The issue of examining documentation in the possession, or performing an 
audit, of a related or other party to a transaction is an extremely sensitive issue in 
contemporary auditing practice. While we desire to avoid any appearance of 
"harassment," auditors should not stop at imaginary lines surrounding an entity if 
the entity appears to extend beyond. 
INQUIRY OF INTERMEDIATES 
- Procedure 
Where a party independent of a material transaction is significantly 
involved in it as a facilitator, consideration should be given to inquiring of 
such intermediate as to his understanding of its terms. 
— Discussion 
In many transactions, there is an intermediate who facilitates. For example, a 
bank may be involved, as between a guarantor and a client. Or a trustee may 
recognize the relationship between a guarantor of a trust's debt and the beneficiary 
of the trust. Many attorneys are intermediaries in that they create legal 
documentation with regard to transactions. 
Of course, it will require the client's authorization to obtain information from 
intermediaries. However, we would expect such authorization to be forthcoming in 
those instances where we conclude this procedure is necessary. 
Blanket inquiry of intermediaries is not intended, and considerable discretion 
should be exercised in making such requests. 
8/1/74 49 T.L. No. 149 
E 4 . E V A L U A T I N G INFORMATION 
G E N E R A L 
Though there is not a great deal of guidance in professional literature as to how 
the auditor should evaluate evidence, SAS No. 1 does offer a few words of advice: 
"The independent auditor should be thorough in his search for evidential matter and 
objective in its evaluation.. .He should recognize the possibility that the financial 
statements may not be presented fairly in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles. In developing his opinion, the auditor must give considera-
tion to relevant evidential matter regardless of whether it appears to support or to 
contradict the representations made in the financial statements."4 0 Also: "To the 
extent the auditor remains in substantial doubt as to any assertion of material 
significance, he must refrain from formulating an opinion until he has obtained 
sufficient competent evidential matter to remove such substantial doubt, or he 
must express a qualified opinion, or a disclaimer of opinion." 4 1 It becomes even 
more difficult to evaluate a material transaction in which it is known there is 
management involvement. 
The purpose of evaluation of information obtained (E-2) and the degree of 
corroboration achieved (E-3) is threefold: 
1. To conclude whether or not there is management involvement in a 
material transaction; if there is, then 
2. What is the appropriate accounting effect and/or disclosure to be given in 
the financial statements, and 
3. What variations, i f any, from the standard audit opinion should be made. 
The following procedures are intended to constitute broad considerations the 
auditor will have to keep in mind; it is not possible at this time to be more specific. 
Furthermore, the auditor will find that available guidance (see Section F) is 
incomplete as to the accounting effects to be given to, nature of disclosure of, and 
auditors' reports concerning, material transactions in which there is management 
involvement; thus considerable exercise of judgment will be required. 
CREDIBLE BUSINESS PURPOSE 
- Procedure in all audits 
The auditor must understand the business purpose of each material 
transaction, and be satisfied the manner in which the transaction is 
consummated is not unduly complex in arriving at such business purpose. 
- Discussion 
If the auditor does not understand the business sense of a material transaction, 
he has not completed his audit. The transaction simply has to make sense. It is 
possible that the auditor could occasionally be at fault in having insufficient 
expertise as to the type of transaction involved. If he cannot promptly obtain the 
necessary expertise he should call for consultation from others within the Firm who 
are familiar with the type of transaction involved. 
A significant example is available in many real estate development transactions, 
4 0 SAS No. 1, ¶330.12 
4 1 SAS No. 1, ¶330.11 
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wherein it is represented that desired tax consequences are arranged as suits the 
various parties. Such situations should be reviewed by personnel from our Firm's tax 
function, to be sure that such is the case. 
Occasionally, an auditor is told that a particular transaction in which there is 
management involvement represents a common practice in the industry. Assuming 
we have in-depth. industry expertise, we may be in a position to recognize the 
validity of the representation. Where we are not otherwise aware of the 
commonality of the practice, it will be necessary for us to examine convincing 
evidence. 
In other instances, the commonness of the transaction will be apparent. For 
example, a subsidiary corporation which sells to or purchases all or a substantial 
portion of its output from its parent, regardless of the nature of the product, can be 
said to be engaged in transactions which not only commonly, but uniformly, have 
management involvement, simply because of the parent/subsidiary relationship. 
Also in the components area, it is relatively common that complete and objective 
allocations are not made between the parent and the subsidiary where there are no 
outside investor interests in the subsidiary. 
It is important that the auditor be aware of such common practices as might 
exist in his client's industry, as an aid in evaluating the treatment to be accorded 
the situation in the financial statements. 
It goes without saying that "acceptable business sense," "credible business 
purpose," or "common practices" cannot provide overriding justification of a 
transaction which is prohibited by law, regulation or covenants. 
SUBSTANCE VERSUS F O R M 
- Procedure in all audits 
The auditor must decide whether material transactions are presented, in 
primary financial statements, in conformity with their substance; if the 
available evidence still leaves significant doubts in this respect, we will have 
to express a qualified opinion or a disclaimer of opinion. 
- Discussion 
The Report of the Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements has 
this important comment (page 57) on the question of substance: "The substantive 
economic characteristics, not the legal or technical form, should establish the 
accounting for transactions and other events. For example, this subordination of 
legal formality may affect the accounting for transactions between affiliated or 
related parties." 
Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4 isn't nearly as strong as the 
foregoing citation. It indicates (¶35) : "Although financial accounting is concerned 
with both the legal and economic effects of transactions and other events and many 
of its conventions are based on legal rules, the economic substance of transactions 
and other events are usually emphasized when economic substance differs from 
legal form." And further (in ¶64): "...the economic substance of some events may 
differ from their legal form. Classification of this kind of event may differ 
depending on whether its form or its substance is considered to govern." 
There is little else in the authoritative accounting literature on this subject. As 
a Firm, we believe that at least in primary financial statements (as opposed to 
component financial statements)42 transactions must be presented in conformity 
42See Section F, and Appendix E of the Accounting and Auditing Report Writing Manual, 
as to component reporting. 
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with their substance. 
The determination of substance is, again, a judgment not susceptible of 
specification. The complexities of contemporary business are such that informed 
practitioners may reach different conclusions on the substance of a given 
transaction. In some instances, as the auditor gathers and evaluates evidence, he 
may become increasingly of the opinion that the accounting effect given to a 
material transaction may not be substantive. 
Substance will always come into question where a transaction between two 
parties of record is discovered to be for the benefit of a third party having 
management influence over both of the transacting parties. Where we encounter 
such situations at the policy levels of the company, it will be advisable that we 
consult our attorneys (through the Executive Partner-Legal) to determine an 
appropriate course of action. 
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
- Procedure in all audits 
In situations where parties deal with each other in material transactions (at 
times mutually conveying the same kind of goods or services), the auditor 
must reach a conclusion as to whether or not the parties are economically 
interdependent. 
- Discussion 
Sometimes the auditor will encounter situations where two or more companies 
deal with each other in material transactions. Such a practice has not been 
uncommon in the real estate industry, for example. The fact that cash changes 
hands does not avoid the question of whether the mutual reciprocity is practiced as 
a means of exaggerating income or financial statement carrying values. While there 
may not be, in the strict sense of the definitions used in this T L , management 
involvement in these transactions, such involvement substantively exists because of 
the propensity of the managements to arrange the transactions. Accordingly, 
"swap" transactions and "parking" transactions will be deemed incomplete 
transactions not giving rise to any profit recognition. 4 3 
When there is a concern that parties are economically interdependent, the 
auditor also has a problem in deciding whether a particular transaction, represented 
to be complete, is or is not a link to any prior or prospective transaction. 
A D E Q U A C Y OF C O L L A T E R A L 
- Procedure in all audits 
Whenever management (as broadly defined in this TL) is indebted to the 
company in a material amount, the auditor is required to obtain evidence 
of the financial ability of management to settle the obligation. If collateral 
for such an obligation exists, the auditor should be satisfied as to its 
acceptability and value. 
- Discussion 
It is not unusual that a management individual's wealth is substantially 
comprised of a stock ownership interest in his company. Under certain 
circumstances (for example, a thin or depressed market for such stock, or the need 
43Refer to APB Opinion No. 29 regarding exchange transactions which do not culminate 
an earnings process. 
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for registration which because of such conditions might be impracticable), net 
worth comprised substantially of stock ownership in the company raises significant 
questions as to the valuation and collectibility of the amount due. This proposition 
is more evident, of course, where the management individual actually posts as 
collateral a portion of his stock investment in the company. 
In some sales transactions it is common that the seller retains a security interest 
in the property sold. Where amounts are receivable from management under these 
circumstances, it is imperative that valid external evidence exists as to the valuation 
of the property pledged as collateral or in which a security interest is held. In the 
real estate industry, appraisals may not be sufficiently convincing. 
V A L U E JUDGMENTS - EQUIVALENCE TESTS 
- Procedure in all audits 
The auditor must inquire of the client (and watch for other evidence of) 
whether a material transaction in which there is management involvement 
has been compared to a similar arm's-length transaction. If such a 
comparison has been made (or is otherwise evident) the auditor should 
examine appropriate underlying evidence to evaluate whether or not the 
transaction results in an effect on the financial statements substantially 
equivalent to what would have occurred had the transaction been an 
arm's-length transaction. 
- Discussion 
Some material transactions in which there is management involvement may be 
susceptible of comparison with arm's-length transactions and a conclusion drawn 
that the results of the transaction were or were not substantially equivalent 4 4 to 
what would have occurred as a result of arm's-length negotiations between 
independent parties. In some situations, this comparison may be self-evident. 
The concept of "equivalence" may be somewhat unfamiliar. Thus, another way 
of describing the auditor's objective under this procedure, is that he is trying to 
reach an opinion as to whether the transaction was "reasonable" or "unreasonable" 
(decisive) or "not unreasonable" or its "reasonableness is not determinable" 
(neutral). 
The auditor should inquire of the client whether such a comparison has been 
made, and the results thereof. Where a comparison has not been made, and is not 
evident, the auditor generally is not required to perform it himself. 
It should be recognized that when there is management involvement in a 
material transaction, it is not possible to determine whether the transaction would 
have taken place if the parties had not been so situated, or if the transaction had 
taken place, what the terms would have been. Therefore, the auditor's concern in 
forming a judgment concerning equivalence is directed more towards the substance 
of a transaction than it is to afford a basis for disclosure of arm's-length equivalence 
in the financial statements. 
Although generally the auditor is not required to make a comparison where the 
company has not done so, he may decide that a significant portion of the evidence 
he requires in connection with the transaction can only be provided by making or 
attempting such comparison. In those situations, he will pursue the matter. 
Further, because disclosure of a material transaction in which there is 
44Equivalence must be judged in the light of all relevant circumstances. Seemingly minor 
differences can often have a major effect on terms and conditions. 
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management involvement will usually be required 4 5 or otherwise may be given in 
the client's financial statements, management may wish to state therein that (if a 
comparison was feasible) the terms of the transaction were substantially equivalent 
(or were not substantially equivalent, and the reasons therefor) to what would have 
been arrived at as a result of arm's-length negotiation between independent parties. 
If the client does not make such a representation in the financial statements, the 
auditor must be satisfied that the comparison, if it was actually made by the client, 
resulted in a conclusion of substantial equivalence; in any event, the auditor must 
not otherwise hold the opinion that substantial equivalence does not exist where a 
comparison was not made, even though it may have been feasible. 
UNAUDITABILITY 
If the auditor, after performing all practicable procedures, is unable to 
conclude that there is sufficient competent evidential matter available to him to 
formulate an opinion as to whether there is management involvement in a material 
transaction, or if there is, whether the transaction is presented in accordance with 
its substance, he will be required to qualify his opinion or express a disclaimer of 
opinion. Materiality measurements for this decision are broader than those stated in 
Section D-5 for purposes of identifying "material transactions." 
There will be occasions when the auditor is faced with this dilemma. While 
insistence upon full disclosure of the transaction in the financial statements may be 
helpful in the auditor's formulation of opinion, he may nonetheless believe that the 
representations contained in the financial statements concerning such transactions, 
if sufficiently material, have not been susceptible of sufficient audit substantiation, 
and therefore, he should so indicate in his auditor's report. 
While the concept of "auditability" naturally exists in all phases of the audit, 
the absence of this characteristic is highlighted for purposes of this T L because 
experience has shown that some management involvement transactions border on 
unauditability. 
45See Section F, "Accounting and Reporting." 
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E-5. DOCUMENTATION 
G E N E R A L 
As mentioned throughout this TL, a large proportion of its requirements will 
be performed in conjunction with our other audit procedures. However, in order to 
evidence that a specific review has been made, certain documentation requirements 
are discussed below. 
AUDIT PROGRAMS 
Our audit program must recognize the objective of this TL, and should indicate 
the procedures required hereby as well as such other procedures as are appropriate 
based upon our understanding of the client's business. In those engagements where 
an integrated program is used (i.e., all major engagements) specific guidance should 
be given in the appropriate program sections, to the extent possible. Where core 
program documents are used from year to year, personnel using such documents are 
required to be conversant with the content of this TL, and the person responsible 
for tailoring the core document shall include such specific procedures as are 
required hereby or are otherwise appropriate based upon our understanding of the 
client's business. 
We do not envision an immediate revision to the core program documents to 
reflect this TL, as we prefer to await results of our experience. 
PERMANENT FILE 
The basic structure and content of permanent files is described in our 
Accounting and Auditing Practice Manual. To the extent a company frequently or 
continually engages in material transactions in which there is management 
involvement, a record of the information contained in Section E-2 hereof should be 
prepared for the permanent file, so that it may be reviewed annually and updated. 
CURRENT WORKING PAPERS 
Our current audit working papers must document the specific procedures we 
perform in obtaining information concerning management involvement in material 
transactions and in corroborating and evaluating evidence examined in connection 
therewith. A "control" listing of material transactions for the current year should 
be prepared to evidence that all were specifically reviewed from the viewpoint of 
possible management involvement. 
Appropriate memoranda should refer to both the foregoing specific review 
procedures, as well as general approaches we took throughout our other audit 
procedures. 
Where management involvement in material transactions exists, the partner in 
charge of the engagement is required to evaluate the financial statement disclosure 
and/or effect, and document this in his engagement memorandum or in a separate 
memorandum, included as part of the current audit files. 
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F. ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 
GENERAL 
Accounting and reporting requirements with respect to management involve-
ment in material transactions are subject to existing and future pronouncements of 
the FASB, AICPA and SEC. When definitive pronouncements are available, these 
will be publicized in our Firm's current releases, and included in revisions of the 
Accounting and Auditing Report Writing Manual and the SEC Manual. 
There seems to be little question that the meaning of financial statements to 
users can be affected by the existence of management involvement in material 
transactions. Whether a user of financial statements would conclude from such 
existence that there is a decreased reliability or completeness of information is 
unknown. Despite these limitations in our empirical knowledge, full disclosure of 
management involvement transactions is generally the appropriate minimum course 
to follow, though it is by no means uniform in current practice as to where such 
disclosure appears — as part of the financial statements, or elsewhere in the material 
accompanying financial statements. 
ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE 
There is little available in accounting and auditing authoritative literature on 
the topic of management involvement in material transactions. SAS No. 1, Para-
graph 430.02, requires disclosure of the nature and volume of transactions with af-
filiated and controlling interests, and there are a few citations in A R B 43 about dis-
closing receivables from officers and about not classifying such receivables as current 
assets except under certain circumstances. In industry audit guides and industry 
accounting guides released by the AICPA, there are some references to transactions 
which would be considered as having management involvement as defined in 
this TL. 
A scrutiny of other professional literature will indicate that such references as 
exist to management involvement (related parties) are often in the context of 
"negative advice," that is, the particular pronouncement is not applicable to 
transactions of that nature. 
A list of excerpts from current professional literature is included in Appendix B. 
The SEC has specified certain disclosures concerning management involvement 
transactions as indicated in Appendix A, but these apply almost entirely to the 
nonfinancial statement portions of the filings required by the Commission. 
The lack of specific authoritative literature does not excuse the auditor from 
reaching a conclusion as to appropriate accounting and disclosure from within the 
broad spectrum of current practice, as he believes appropriate in his judgment. 
Therefore we have established the following requirements: 
SUBSTANCE VS. FORM 
1. Reaffirming current practice, transactions should be presented in accord-
ance with their substance in financial statements (see below with respect 
to component statements) with which we are to be associated. Where 
existing professional literature states a presumption as to the substance of 
a transaction, such presumption should be followed in the absence of 
overriding evidence to the contrary. 4 6 
46Some presumptions are specifically or de facto irrefutable. For example, the AICPA 
Audit Guide, Profit Recognition on Sales of Real Estate," consists mostly of de facto 
irrefutable presumptions. 
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2. Most professional accounting requirements have sufficient adaptability to 
accommodate the substance of transactions to which they apply. Where 
adherence to an APB Opinion, A R B or FASB statement may result in a 
misleading presentation, Rule 203 of the AICPA Code of Professional 
Ethics must be considered. (No avail of Rule 203 may be made without 
approval of the National Director of Accounting and Auditing.) We would 
expect almost every such situation solvable by a conclusion that the extant 
accounting requirement is not intended to be applicable, coupled with full 
disclosure. 
3. Because knowledgeable professionals may differ as to the substance of a 
given material transaction, what is expected is that, when there is doubt as 
to substance, we obtain sufficient evidence to reach a reasonable 
conclusion. Where this cannot be accomplished, our auditors' report must 
be appropriately modified (see below). 
4. The substance of material transactions in which there is management 
involvement is, of course, also subject to the preceding requirements. It is 
more difficult to reach a conclusion as to substance, because the absence 
of arm's-lengthness raises questions as to whether the transaction is 
complete. The auditor is required to carefully consider whether the 
substance of a related party transaction requires an accounting treatment 
which defers profit recognition, or states amounts at arm's-length 
equivalents where reasonably determinable and available. 
COMPONENTS 
5. Where we are to be associated with financial statements of a component of 
an entity, either because we issue a separate component report as part of 
our overall engagement or because we are not auditors for the entire 
entity, we recognize the probability that intercomponent transactions have 
been arranged for the benefit of the entire entity. Appendix E of the 
Accounting and Auditing Report Writing Manual, "Components of a 
business enterprise," specifies our policies on components, which differ in 
some instances from the accounting and disclosure requirements of this 
TL. Appendix E governs where it applies, pending resolution of the issues 
by the FASB. 
DISCLOSURE 
6. The existence of management involvement in material transactions should 
be disclosed in the financial statements or notes thereto. This applies even 
where recognition of substance has required a revision in the financial 
statement presentation. The disclosures often may be abbreviated by 
cross-referencing to disclosures contained in the document (published 
report, prospectus, proxy, etc.) which will include the financial state-
ments. Disclosure of management involvement in transactions, not deemed 
to be material under the definitions of this TL, need not be included in the 
financial statements, though management may choose to do so. (See 
Section E-4, "Value judgments; equivalence tests" concerning disclosure of 
arm's-length equivalence.) 
7. The information to be disclosed is given in Section E-2, "Obtaining 
information — general," to the extent that each element is applicable and 
material. 
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8. Disclosure is not an acceptable substitute for revision of accounting 
treatment where that is clearly needed. 
CURRENT PRACTICE - AUDITORS' REPORT 
There is nothing in the authoritative literature concerning a revision of the 
auditors' report in event of management involvement in material transactions. Our 
Firm's policies in this area stated in Appendix E of the Accounting and Auditing 
Report Writing Manual, are basically limited to components of business enterprises. 
Until such time as authoritative literature takes a position on this matter, we will 
not vary from our present basic practice of letting financial statements speak for 
themselves in this area. We do encourage the use of a middle explanatory paragraph 
where involvement is substantial; the use of this type of emphasis given to material 
matters, without affecting the nature of the auditors' opinion, is sanctioned by SAS 
No. 1, paragraph 545.03. In some cases the auditor may conclude it is essential to 
use this method of emphasis. 
Following usual reporting rules, where the auditor is not in agreement with the 
accounting treatment or disclosure of material transactions in which there is 
management involvement, he should, depending on the magnitudes, qualify his 
opinion or express an adverse opinion explaining the exception and effects thereof. 
If the auditor has not been able to satisfy himself as to the appropriateness of such 
accounting treatment or disclosure, or as to whether there is management 
involvement in material transactions, he should, depending on the magnitudes, 
qualify his opinion or disclaim an opinion; in some cases the scope paragraph will 
describe an attendant scope limitation. 
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APPENDIX A 
SEC DEFINITIONS OF CERTAIN POSITIONS 
WHICH M A Y BE " M A N A G E M E N T " 
UNDER T L 149; SEC DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
We have compiled the following citations from the various Acts administered 
by the SEC and from certain releases and guides issued thereunder. This listing is 
not a complete recitation of all applicable SEC references, and the context in which 
the definition or requirement is found is not described herein. 
DEFINITIONS 
Regulation S-X, Rule 1-02 
Affiliate. — An "affiliate" of, or a person "affiliated" with, a specific person is 
a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, 
or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the person specified. 
TR Note: There are numerous other definitions of affiliate appearing in SEC 
Acts and Regulations. Those similar to the S-X 1-02 definition are found in: 
Regulation A of 1933 Act 
Regulation E of 1933 Act 
Regulation C of 1933 Act 
Section 5 of 1933 Act 
Regulation S-X, Article 6B, Rule 6-21.4 
Form S-1 
Regulation 12B of 1934 Act 
Trust Indenture Act 
Certain Acts specify, in addition, a 5 percent voting power, as an affiliation 
factor: 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
Investment Company Act of 1940 
Investment Adviser's Act 
Control. - The term "control" (including the terms "controlling," "controlled 
by" and "under common control with") means the possession, direct or indirect, of 
the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a 
person, whether through the ownership of voting shares, by contract, or otherwise. 
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Fifty-percent-owned person. — The term "50 percent-owned person," in 
relation to a specified person, means a person approximately 50 percent of whose 
outstanding voting shares is owned by the specified person either directly, or 
indirectly through one or more intermediaries. 
Majority-owned subsidiary. - The term "majority-owned subsidiary" means a 
subsidiary more than 50 percent of whose outstanding voting shares is owned by its 
parent and/or the parent's other majority-owned subsidiaries. 
Parent. — A "parent" of a specified person is an affiliate controlling such 
person directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries. 
Principal holder of equity securities. — The term "principal holder of equity 
securities," used in respect of a registrant or other person named in a particular 
statement or report, means a holder of record or a known beneficial owner of more 
than 10 percent of any class of equity securities of the registrant or other person, 
respectively, as of the date of the related balance sheet filed. 
Promoter. — The term "promoter" includes — 
(a) Any person who, acting alone or in conjunction with one or more other 
persons, directly or indirectly takes initiative in founding and organizing the 
business or enterprise of an issuer; 
(b) Any person who, in connection with the founding and organizing of the 
business or enterprise of an issuer, directly or indirectly receives in consideration of 
services or property, or both services and property, 10 percent or more of any class 
of securities of the issue or 10 percent or more of the proceeds from the sale of any 
class of securities. However, a person who receives such securities or proceeds either 
solely as underwriting commissions or solely in consideration of property shall not 
be deemed a promoter within the meaning of this paragraph if such person does not 
otherwise take part in founding and organizing the enterprise. 
Subsidiary. — A "subsidiary" of a specified person is an affiliate controlled by 
such person directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries. 
Regulation 14A (Proxies) Rule 14a-1 
Associate. — The term "associate" used to indicate a relationship with any 
person, means (1) any corporation or organization (other than the issuer or a 
majority-owned subsidiary of the issuer) of which such person is an officer or 
partner or is, directly or indirectly, the beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of 
any class of equity securities, (2) any trust or other estate in which such person has 
a substantial beneficial interest or as to which such person serves as trustee or in a 
similar fiduciary capacity, and (3) any relative or spouse of such person, or any 
relative of such spouse, who has the same home as such person or who is a director 
or officer of the issuer or any of its parents or subsidiaries. 
Accounting Series Releases 
ASRs (and Securities Acts Releases) often mention or imply matters with 
respect to related parties. Because the context of the release is essential to an 
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understanding of the matter, we do not cite much from these releases. A few 
releases bear specific mention: 
ASR 95 (1962) - Accounting for real estate transactions, now effectively 
updated by the AICPA guide, "Accounting for Profit Recognition on Sales 
of Real Estate." Among the circumstances listed raising a question as to 
the propriety of current profit recognition are 
"4. Retention of effective control of the property by the seller." 
"6. Simultaneous sale and repurchase by the same or affiliated 
interests." 
"7. Concurrent loans to purchasers." 
ASR 118 (1970) — Valuation of investment securities by investment com-
panies; securities for which market quotations are not readily available are 
to be fair valued in good faith by the board of directors. A qualified 
auditor's opinion is acceptable if the auditor is unable to form an opinion 
as to the values stated, provided other conditions are met. 
ASR 132 (1972) — Accounting for leases in financial statements of lessees, in 
transactions where the "lessor is created with no real economic substance 
other than to serve as a conduit by which debt financing can be obtained 
by the 'lessee'." Subsequent interpretations have deemed the lessor 
independent if he has material independent economic substance (net 
worth, say, of more than $500,000), and a 5 per cent equity invested in the 
leased property. 
DISCLOSURES 
Form S-1 
Form S-1, like a number of other forms under the 1933 Act, requires certain 
disclosures concerning management and "others." (Excerpts are given.) 
Item 16. Directors and Executive Officers. 
List the names of all directors and executive officers of the registrant and 
all persons chosen to become directors or executive officers. Indicate all 
positions and offices with the registrant held by each person named, and the 
principal occupations during the past five years of each executive officer and 
each person chosen to become an executive officer. 
Item 17. Remuneration of Directors and Officers. 
(a) Furnish information in tabular form as to all direct remuneration paid 
by the registrant and its subsidiaries during the registrant's last fiscal year to 
the following persons for services in all capacities: 
(1) Each director, and each of the three highest paid officers, of the 
registrant whose aggregate direct remuneration exceeded $30,000, naming 
each such person. 
(2) All directors and officers of the registrant as a group, without 
naming them. 
(b) Furnish information, in tabular form, as to all pension or retirement 
benefits proposed to be paid under any existing plan in the event of retirement 
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at normal retirement date, directly or indirectly, by the registrant or any of its 
subsidiaries to each director or officer named in answer to paragraph (a) (1) 
above. 
(c) Describe briefly all remuneration payments (other than payments 
reported under paragraph (a) or (b) of this item) proposed to be made in the 
future, directly or indirectly, by the registrant or any of its subsidiaries 
pursuant to any existing plan or arrangement to (i) each director or officer 
named in answer to paragraph (a) (1), naming each such person, and (ii) all 
directors and officers of the registrant as a group, without naming them. 
Item 18. (With respect to options to purchase options) 
(c) Furnish separately the information called for by paragraph (b) above 
for all options held by (i) each director or officer named in answer to 
paragraph (a) (1) of Item 17 naming each such person, and (ii) all directors and 
officers as a group without naming them. 
Item 19. Principal Holders of Securities. 
Furnish the following information as of a specified date within 90 days 
prior to the date of filing in tabular form: 
(a) As to the voting securities of the registrant owned of record or 
beneficially by each person who owns of record, or is known by the registrant 
to own beneficially, more than 10 percent of any class of such securities. Show 
whether the securities are owned both of record and beneficially, of record 
only, or beneficially only, and show the respective amounts and percentages 
owned in each such manner. 
(b) As to each class of equity securities of the registrant or any of its 
parents or subsidiaries, other than directors' qualifying shares, beneficially 
owned directly or indirectly by all directors and officers of the registrant, as a 
group, without naming them. 
Item 20. Interest of Management and Others in Certain Transactions. 
Describe briefly, and where practicable state the approximate amount of 
any material interest, direct or indirect, of any of the following persons in any 
material transactions during the last three years, or in any material proposed 
transactions, to which the registrant or any of its subsidiaries was, or is to be, a 
party: 
(a) Any director or officer of the registrant; 
(b) Any security holder named in answer to Item 19 (a); 
(c) Any associate of any of the foregoing persons. 
Regulation 14A 
Item 7. Remuneration and Other Transactions With Management and Others 
((a), (b), and (c) substantially the same as in Item 17, Form S-1; (d) 
substantially the same as Item 18, Form S-1) 
(e) State as to each of the following persons who was indebted to the 
issuer or its subsidiaries at any time since the beginning of the last fiscal year of 
the issuer, (i) the largest aggregate amount of indebtedness outstanding at any 
time during such period, (ii) the nature of the indebtedness and of the 
transaction in which it was incurred, (iii) the amount thereof outstanding as of 
the latest practicable date, and (iv) the rate of interest paid or charged thereon: 
(1) Each director or officer of the issuer; 
(2) Each nominee for election as a director; and, 
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(3) Each associate of any such director, officer or nominee. 
(f) Describe briefly any transactions since the beginning of the issuer's last 
fiscal year or any presently proposed transactions, to which the issuer or any of 
its subsidiaries was or is to be a party, in which any of the following persons 
had or is to have a direct or indirect material interest, naming such person and 
stating his relationship to the issuer, the nature of his interest in the transaction 
and, where practicable, the amount of such interest: 
(1) Any director or officer of the issuer; 
(2) Any nominee for election as a director; 
(3) Any security holder named in answer to Item 5 (d); or 
(4) Any relative or spouse of any of the foregoing persons, or any 
relative of such spouse, who has the same home as such person or 
who is a director or officer of any parent or subsidiary of the 
issuer. 
(g) Describe briefly any transactions since the beginning of the issuer's last 
fiscal year or any presently proposed transactions to which any pension, 
retirement, savings or similar plan provided by the issuer, or any of its parents 
or subsidiaries, was or is to be a party, in which any of the following persons 
had or is to have a direct or indirect material interest, naming such person and 
stating his relationship to the issuer, the nature of his interest in the transaction 
and, where practicable, the amount of such interest: 
(same listing as in (f) above). 
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APPENDIX B 
EXCERPTS FROM CURRENT PROFESSIONAL 
LITERATURE REGARDING RELATED PARTIES 
Appearing herein are excerpts from AICPA pronouncements*, which bear in 
some way on the question of accounting (e.g., substance over form) and disclosure 
for management (related party) involvement in material transactions. Only 
"authoritative" literature has been included - either enforceable under the Code of 
Professional Ethics, or requiring that a member be prepared to justify a departure 
from the requirement. Thus, APB Statements are excluded, as are FASB Discussion 
Memoranda and Exposure Drafts. These excerpts are not necessarily all that could 
be included; other passages in the literature could be read to implicitly deal with, or 
exclude treatment of, related parties. 
This material will be updated and further classified as we gain experience with 
TL 149. 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, pp. 78-9, ¶430.02 
"The fairness of presentation of financial statements in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles comprehends the adequacy of 
disclosures involving material matters. These matters relate to . . . . . the exist-
ence of affiliated or controlling interests and the nature and volume of trans 
actions with such interests." 
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, Chapter 1, Section A, ¶5 
"Notes or accounts receivable due from officers, employees, or affiliated 
companies must be shown separately and not included under a general heading 
such as notes receivable or accounts receivable." 
Accounting Research Bulletin 43, Chapter 3, ¶4 
"4. For accounting purposes, the term current assets . . . comprehends in 
general such resources as . . . (d) receivables from officers, employees, affiliates, 
and others, if collectible in the ordinary course of business within a year.. ." 
APB Opinion No. 5, "Reporting of Leases in Financial Statements of Lesses," (¶12 
and ¶15 and part of ¶21) 
"12. In cases in which the lessee and the lessor are related, leases should often 
be treated as purchases even though they do not meet the criteria set forth in 
paragraphs 10 and 11, i.e., even though no direct equity is being built up by 
the lessee. In these cases, a lease should be recorded as a purchase if a primary 
purpose of ownership of the property by the lessor is to lease it to the lessee 
and (1) the lease payments are pledged to secure the debts of the lessor or 
(2) the lessee is able, directly or indirectly, to control or influence significantly 
the actions of the lessor with respect to the lease. The following illustrate 
situations in which these conditions are frequently present: 
a. The lessor is an unconsolidated subsidiary of the lessee, or the lessee and 
the lessor are subsidiaries of the same parent and either is unconsolidated. 
* ©American Institute of CPAs; excerpts printed with permission. 
8/1/74 64 T.L. No. 149 
b. The lessee and the lessor have common officers, directors or shareholders 
to a significant degree. 
c. The lessor has been created, directly or indirectly, by the lessee and is 
substantially dependent on the lessee for its operations. 
d. The lessee (or its parent) has the right, through options or otherwise, to 
acquire control of the lessor." 
"15. Leases which are clearly in substance installment purchases of property 
(see paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12) should be recorded as purchases. The 
property and the obligation should be stated in the balance sheet at an 
appropriate discounted amount of future payments under the lease agreement. 
A note or schedule may be required to disclose significant provisions of the 
transaction. The method of amortizing the amount of the asset to income 
should be appropriate to the nature and use of the asset and should be chosen 
without reference to the period over which the related obligation is 
discharged." 
"21. The Board is of the opinion that the sale and the leaseback usually 
cannot be accounted for as independent transactions. Neither the sale price nor 
the annual rental can be objectively evaluated independently of the other." 
APB Opinion No. 27, "Accounting for Lease Transactions by Manufacturer or Dealer 
Lessors," ¶15 and 16 
Transactions with Related Companies 
15. Leases equivalent to sales. The sale or assignment by a manufacturer 
or dealer to a related company 1 5 of a lease, or property subject to a lease, that 
meets, insofar as the lease transaction is concerned, the conditions of paragraph 
4 does not negate the original determination that the lease transaction should 
be accounted for as a sale. Profit or loss, if any, on the transaction with the 
related company should be recognized following the principles of ARB No. 51, 
Consolidated Financial Statements, or APB Opinion No. 18, The Equity 
Method of Accounting for Investments in Common Stock, whichever is 
appropriate. 
16. Operating Leases. The sale to a related company of property (or an 
undivided interest in the property) subject to an operating lease, or of property 
(or an undivided interest in the property) which is leased by or intended to be 
leased by the related company to an independent party, is not a sale in 
substance i f the manufacturer or dealer retains any risks of ownership in the 
property and, therefore, should not be accounted for as a sale. Likewise, the 
sale or assignment to a related company of lease payments due under an 
operating lease should continue to be accounted for under the operating 
method by the manufacturer or dealer. Further, the lease of property to a 
15For the purposes of this section (paragraphs 15 and 16) of this Opinion a related 
company is considered to be a subsidiary, corporate joint venture, partnership, 
unincorporated joint venture or other investee in which the manufacturer or dealer 
has a financial interest. Financial interest refers to those situations in which the 
manufacturer or dealer directly or indirectly controls the related company or has the 
ability to exercise significant influence over operating and financial policies of the 
related company. (See Opinion No. 18, paragraph 17.) Significant influence may be 
exercised through guarantees of indebtedness, extension of credit and other special 
arrangements, or ownership of warrants, debt obligations or other securities. 
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related company should not be considered a sale by the manufacturer or dealer 
unless the related company has leased the property to an independent lessee in 
a transaction that meets the conditions of paragraph 4 of this Opinion and the 
manufacturer or dealer retains no risks of ownership in the property. When a 
sale is recorded by the manufacturer or dealer, all costs should be charged 
against income in that period (see paragraph 6). Profit or loss, if any, on the 
transaction with the related company should be recognized following the 
principles of A R B No. 51 or APB Opinion No. 18, whichever is appropriate. 
APB Opinion No. 10, "Omnibus Opinion — 1966," ¶4 (in part) and footnote thereto 
"The Board is of the opinion that, in the preparation of consolidated financial 
statements for periods subsequent to the effective date of this Opinion, the 
accounts of all subsidiaries (regardless of when organized or acquired) whose 
principal business activity is leasing property or facilities to their parents or 
other affiliates should be consolidated . . . because of the significance of their 
assets and liabilities to the consolidated financial position of the enterprise.5 
APB Opinion No. 16, "Business Combinations," ¶5, in part 
"The term business combination in this Opinion excludes a transfer by a 
corporation of its net assets to a newly formed substitute corporate entity 
chartered by the existing corporation and a transfer of net assets or exchange 
of shares between companies under common control (control is described in 
paragraph 2 of A R B No. 51), such as between a parent corporation and its 
subsidiary or between two subsidiary corporations of the same parent." 
APB Opinion No. 16, "Business Combinations," ¶43, in part 
"The acquisition after the effective date of this Opinion of some or all of the 
stock held by minority stockholders of a subsidiary — whether acquired by the 
parent, the subsidiary itself, or another affiliate — should be accounted for by 
the purchase method rather than by the pooling of interests method." 
APB Opinion No. 16, "Business Combinations" ¶6, in part 
"46. Combining companies. Certain attributes of combining companies indi-
cate that independent ownership interests are combined in their entirety to 
continue previously separate operations." 
"a. Each of the combining companies is autonomous and has not been a 
subsidiary or division of another corporation within two years before the 
plan of combination is initiated." 
"b. Each of the combining companies is independent of the other combining 
companies. This condition means that at the dates the plan of combination 
5"The Board is giving further consideration to the accounting treatment of lease 
transactions. In the meantime, it has deferred expressing an opinion on the inclusion in 
consolidated financial statements of companies organized in connection with leasing 
transactions in which the equity interest usually nominal at the time of organization, is 
held by third parties, but in which the principal lessee, through options or by similar 
devices, possesses or has the power to obtain the economic benefits of ownership from 
the lease arrangements." 
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is initiated and consummated the combining companies hold as inter-
corporate investments no more than 10 percent in total of the outstanding 
voting common stock of any combining company." 
APB Opinion No. 16 "Business Combinations," ¶99, in part 
"99. If a corporation holds as an investment on October 31, 1970 a minority 
interest in or exactly 50 percent of the common stock of another company and 
the corporation initiates after October 31, 1970 a plan of combination with 
that company, the resulting business combination may be accounted for by the 
pooling of interests method. . . ." [if certain conditions are met]. 
APB Opinion No. 18, "The Equity Method of Accounting for Investments in 
Common Stocks," ¶4 (from ¶1 of A R B No. 51) and ¶17 
"4. There is a presumption that consolidated statements are more meaningful 
than separate statements and that they are usually necessary for a fair 
presentation when one of the companies in the group directly or indirectly has 
a controlling financial interest in the other companies." 
"17. The Board concludes that the equity method of accounting for an 
investment in common stock should also be followed by an investor whose 
investment in voting stock gives it the ability to exercise significant influence 
over operating and financial policies of an investee even though the investor 
holds 50% or less of the voting stock. Ability to exercise that influence may be 
indicated in several ways, such as representation on the board of directors, 
participation in policy making processes, material intercompany transactions, 
interchange of managerial personnel, or technological dependency. Another 
important consideration is the extent of ownership by an investor in relation to 
the concentration of other shareholdings, but substantial or majority owner-
ship of the voting stock of an investee by another investor does not necessarily 
preclude the ability to exercise significant influence by the investor. The Board 
recognizes that determining the ability of an investor to exercise such influence 
is not always clear and applying judgment is necessary to assess the status of 
each investment. In order to achieve a reasonable degree of uniformity in 
application, the Board concludes that an investment (direct or indirect) of 20% 
or more of the voting stock of an investee should lead to a presumption that in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary an investor has the ability to exercise 
significant influence over an investee. Conversely, an investment of less than 
20% of the voting stock of an investee should lead to a presumption that an 
investor does not have the ability to exercise significant influence unless such 
ability can be demonstrated." [Income tax treatment for investments 
accounted for by the equity method is given in APB Opinions 23 and 24.] 
APB Opinion No. 21, "Interest on Receivables and Payables," ¶3 (f) 
"3. Except that paragraph 16 covering statement presentation of discount and 
premium is applicable in all circumstances, this Opinion is not intended to 
apply to: 
(f) transactions between parent and subsidiary companies and between 
subsidiaries of a common parent.2 
2The Board has deferred consideration of the treatment of transactions between such 
companies pending consideration of the subject of reporting on components of a 
business enterprise and completion of the Accounting Research Study on inter-
corporate investments. 
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APB Opinion No. 23, "Accounting for Income Taxes — Special Areas," ¶10 
"10. Timing difference. The Board believes it should be presumed that all 
undistributed earnings of a subsidiary will be transferred to the parent 
company. Accordingly, the undistributed earnings of a subsidiary included in 
consolidated income (or in income of the parent company) should be 
accounted for as a timing difference, except to the extent that some or all of 
the undistributed earnings meet the criteria in paragraph 12." [which explains 
factors overcoming the presumption] 
APB Opinion 29, "Accounting for Nonmonetary Transactions," ¶23 and 26 in part 
"Nonreciprocal Transfers to Owners. Accounting for the distribution of 
nonmonetary assets to owners of an enterprise in a spin-off or other form of 
reorganization or liquidation or in a plan that is in substance the rescission of a 
prior business combination should be based on the recorded amount (after 
reduction, if appropriate, for an indicated impairment of value) of the 
nonmonetary assets distributed. A prorata distribution to owners of an 
enterprise of shares of a subsidiary or other investee company that has been or 
is being consolidated or that has been or is being accounted for under the 
equity method is to be considered to be equivalent to a spin-off. Other 
nonreciprocal transfers of nonmonetary assets to owners should be accounted 
for at fair value if the fair value of the nonmonetary asset distributed is 
objectively measurable and would be clearly realizable to the distributing 
entity in an outright sale at or near the time of the distribution." " A n 
exchange involving parties with essentially opposing interests is not considered 
a prerequisite to determining a fair value of a nonmonetary asset transferred; 
nor does an exchange insure that a fair value for accounting purposes can be 
ascertained within reasonable limits." 
Accounting Interpretations of APB Opinion No. 7, APB Accounting Principles, 
Vol . 2, p. 9718 
Transactions with Affiliates 
Some manufacturers or dealers have ownership interests in investee 
companies (see section 5131), partnerships, or unincorporated joint ventures to 
whom they sell or assign leases or sell property which is leased to independent 
lessees. The considerations discussed in this Accounting Interpretation also 
apply to these transactions. In addition, elimination of intercompany profits 
and losses may be required. 
Accounting Interpretation of APB Opinion No. 16, APB Accounting Principles, 
Vol. 2, p. 9727 
27. Entities Under Common Control in a Business Combination . . . 
How does the opinion apply to a combination involving one entity 
controlled by one or a few individuals who control several other entities? . . . 
"Considerable judgment will usually be required to determine the substance of 
a combination involving one (or more) of several companies under common 
control. For example, it may be necessary to look beyond the form of the legal 
organizations to determine substance when an unincorporated business or a 
closely held corporation owned by one or a few individuals who also control 
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other entities is involved since the dividing lines may not be as 'sharp' as they 
would be in publicly held corporations with wide ownership interests." [the 
full interpretation text is much longer] 
"Accounting interpretation of APB Opinion No. 25 and A R B No. 43, Chapter 13B, 
The Journal of Accountancy, June 1973, page 73 
Question — Accounting for compensatory and noncompensatory stock option, 
purchase and award plans adopted by a corporation is discussed in APB Opinion 
No. 25 and A R B No. 43, Chapter 13B. Should a corporation account for plans or 
transactions ("plans"), if they have characteristics otherwise similar to compen-
satory plans adopted by corporations, that are established or financed by a 
principal stockholder (i.e., one who either owns 10 percent or more of the 
corporation's common stock or has the ability, directly or indirectly, to control or 
influence significantly the corporation)? 
Interpretation - It is difficult to evaluate a principal stockholder's intent when 
he establishes or finances a plan with characteristics otherwise similar to 
compensatory plans generally adopted by corporations. A principal stockholder 
may be satisfying his generous nature, settling a moral obligation, or attempting to 
increase or maintain the value of his own investment. If a principal stockholder's 
intention is to enhance or maintain the value of his investment by entering into 
such an arrangement, the corporation is implicitly benefiting from the plan by 
retention of, and possibly improved performance by, the employee. In this case, the 
benefits to a principal stockholder and to the corporation are generally impossible 
to separate." [the full text is much longer] 
Medicare Audit Guide, p. 21 
Related Organizations 
The Medicare regulations place limitations on costs of services and supplies 
purchased from related organizations. Transactions with related organizations 
and individuals occur among both proprietary and nonprofit organizations. The 
independent auditor should be alert for such transactions and should consider 
obtaining a representation letter from the provider covering this area. 
Hospital Audit Guide, pp. 11-12 
Hospitals as a Part of Other Organizations 
A hospital may be a part of a larger organization, such as a medical school 
or a university, or one of a group of hospitals in a corporation or a subsidiary 
corporation. A government hospital may be a part of some larger governmental 
unit. Affiliated hospitals may be operated under special management and 
affiliation arrangements. 
Accounting practices and reports of the hospital entity alone should 
conform to those set forth in this guide. 
Other Related Organizations 
Auxiliaries, guilds, fund-raising groups, and other related organizations 
frequently assist hospitals. If such organizations are not under the control of 
the hospital (usually these organizations are independent and are characterized 
by their own charter, bylaws, tax-exempt status, and governing board), the 
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financial reporting of these organizations should be separate from reports of 
the hospital. If significant resources or operations of a hospital are handled by 
such organizations, full disclosure should be made of the related facts and 
circumstances. If such organizations are under control of (or common control 
with) hospitals and handle hospital resources, their financial statements should 
be combined with those of the hospital. 
Audits of Investment Companies, pp. 71-2 
Personal Holding Companies 
A personal holding company cannot qualify as a regulated investment 
company. Two basic tests are applied in determining whether a corporation is a 
personal holding company: (1)the type of income test and (2) the stock 
ownership test. Regulated investment companies usually meet the "type of 
income test," since most of their income is generally passive, i.e., dividends and 
interest. Therefore, it is essential that companies consider carefully the 
consequences of "stock ownership" as described below. 
Under the stock ownership test, a corporation is considered a personal 
holding company if at any time during the last half of its taxable year more 
than 50 percent in value of its outstanding stock is owned, directly or 
indirectly, by or for not more than five "individuals." 
Audit of Investment Companies, p. 79 
Transactions with Affiliates 
The independent auditor should be familiar with Section 17 of the 1940 
Act and related rules which contain certain prohibitions with respect to 
transactions with affiliates. The auditor should obtain representations from 
management as to affiliations with certain persons for his use in considering 
whether additional disclosure is required. 
Where there are related entities, such as an underwriter or investment 
adviser, confirmation of transactions, examination of supporting documents, 
written representations from the managements of the related entities, and 
other auditing procedures may be appropriate in the circumstances. Those 
procedures may be of particular importance where the independent accountant 
for the investment company is not the auditor for the related entities. In such 
cases, the audit procedures would be facilitated if the auditor were granted free 
access to the pertinent accounting records of the related entities and to the 
auditor for those entities. 
Audits of Finance Companies, p. 67 
A large portion of the business of most insurance company subsidiaries of 
finance companies consists of sales of (1) credit life and accident and health 
and (2) fire and casualty policies to customers of the finance company or its 
other subsidiaries and affiliates. Fair presentation of the financial statements in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles requires full con-
solidation of an insurance company subsidiary with its parent finance company 
whenever a majority of the insurance revenue originates with finance customers 
of related finance companies. 
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Accounting for Franchise Fee Revenues, pp. 13, 14, 17, 18 
"Relationships Between Franchisee and Franchisor. Occasionally a fran-
chisor has an equity interest in a business acquiring a franchise. Because of the 
intercompany nature of the transaction, any profit on the sale of the franchise 
to this business should be recognized only after the elimination of inter-
company profits. The elimination of intercompany profits is discussed in ARB 
No. 51, APB Opinion No. 18, related AICPA accounting interpretations. 
Other unusual relationships may exist in addition to those established by 
the franchise agreement or an equity interest. Occasionally, a franchisor 
guarantees borrowings of a franchisee. In other instances the franchisor may 
have a creditor interest in the franchisee or, by sales or other agreements, 
control the operations of a franchisee to such an extent that the franchisee is 
for all practical purposes an affiliate of the franchisor. In still another situation 
two franchisors may agree to pool their risks through sales of their respective 
franchises to each other. Before recognizing revenue from sales between such 
parties, consideration must be given to the substance of the sale transaction in 
context with the other relationships. Revenue should not be recognized if these 
other relationships overcome the concepts of revenue recognition referred to 
above. 
In some cases, a potential relationship is established by a franchise 
agreement which contains a provision giving the franchisor an option to 
purchase the franchisee's business. An analysis of business practices indicates 
that franchisors may purchase a profitable franchisee as a matter of 
management policy or may purchase a franchisee who is in financial difficulty 
or is unable to continue in business in order to preserve the reputation and 
goodwill of the franchise system. Although the existence of such an option 
provision does not dictate the accounting, its existence requires that 
consideration be given to the likelihood of acquisition of the franchisee's 
business when accounting for the initial franchise fee. The substance of such 
transactions may, in certain circumstances, differ from their form. If an 
analysis of all of the surrounding circumstances indicates little doubt that the 
franchisor ultimately will acquire the franchised outlet or that an under-
standing exists that the option will be exercised, the initial franchise fee should 
not be reported as revenue; on exercise of the option, the amount deferred 
would serve to reduce the franchisor's investment in the outlet." 
Accounting for Reacquired Franchises 
Business Combination 
Assuming the absence of a relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee at the time of the franchise sale sufficient to have precluded revenue 
recognition (see earlier discussion), the business combination will ordinarily 
represent a transaction which should be accounted for using conventional 
practices.. . 
The current transaction, being at arm's length, should not affect prior 
accounting, and no adjustment of revenue is appropriate merely because the 
companies had transacted business while they were independent. 
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Accounting for Profit Recognition on Sales of Real Estate, pp. 2-4, 13, 14 
"5. The Committee believes that the matters with the greatest impact on the 
timing of profit recognition are (b) continuing involvement of the seller 
with property sold. 
"7. Revenue (and profit) is conventionally recognized at the time an asset is 
sold, provided . . . . (b) the earnings process is complete or virtually com-
plete — that is, the seller is not obliged to perform significant activities after 
the sale in order to earn the revenue. 
"11. Economic substance should determine the timing of recognition, amount, 
and designation of revenue if the economic substance of a transaction differs 
from its legal form. Economic substance of a transaction may differ from its 
legal form in several ways. For example, a transaction that is in the legal form 
of a sale (that is, title to or possession of a product or other asset is transferred 
in exchange for cash or a promise to pay cash) may be in economic substance 
(a) a construction contract, (b) a contract for services for a fee, (c) a lease for 
use of product or property, (d) an agreement to loan or borrow funds, (e) an 
agreement establishing a joint venture, (f) an agreement to divide profits in a 
specified ratio, (g) a deposit on or an option to purchase the asset, or (h) a 
sale of something (for example, depreciation or other deductions for income 
taxes or a right to participate in profits from operating the asset) other than 
the asset that is the apparent object of the 'sale.' 
"12 Examining the rights and obligations of the parties under the 
contract, the patterns of cash flows, the nature of the interest retained by the 
'seller,' and the like should indicate the substance of the transaction and the 
method of accounting that should be applied. 
"41 Recognition of all or part of the profit from a sales contract should 
be postponed to await performance by the seller if continued involvement by 
the seller includes obligations to perform specific significant parts of the 
contract after the time of sale. 
"42 A sales contract should not be accounted for as a sale if the 'seller's' 
continued involvement with the property carries in essence the same kinds of 
risks as does ownership of property." 
Accounting for Retail Land Sales, p. 23 
"66. Major categories of sales and related cost of sales should be disclosed 
separately, e.g., retail lot sales, bulk lot sales, construction sales, and sales of 
amenities. Also, the extent of sales to brokers, salesmen, and affiliated entities, 
including joint ventures should be disclosed. Revenue recognized on the 
performance of improvement work and related costs should be separately 
disclosed." 
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